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No. 1324

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CSCE FINAL ACT IMPLEMENTATION AND EUROPEAN DETENTE EVALUATED

Warsaw SPRAWY MIEDZYNARODOWE in Polish No 9, Sep 76, pp 14-35

[Article by Adam D. Rotfeld, lecturer in the Institute for Problems of European Security at the Polish Institute for International Affairs: "Implementation of the CSCE Final Act and the Development of Detente in Europe"]

[Excerpts] The principles and recommendations agreed upon during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have been recognized as a code of good behavior for 35 countries of Europe and North America in their mutual relations. The Helsinki Conference has defined the framework, directions and forms of continuing development of detente and the cooperation process, and it has also determined a sui generis model or, in other words, a basic standard which constitutes today a point of reference and evaluation criterion of relations amongst countries, particularly amongst countries with different social systems. The CSCE Final Act expresses the decision of the participating countries to:

a) Assure full effectiveness of the results of the Conference; b) guarantee for themselves and for Europe as a whole the benefits ensuring from these results and, by the same token, c) expand and deepen the process of detente and endow it with a continuous and lasting character.¹

The first days and months after the conclusion of the CSCE have already brought numerous attempts of confrontation of the CSCE Final Act with the European reality, and of formulating on this basis a variety of evaluations: From publications stressing the historic significance of the resolutions of the Conference² to extremely negative opinions attempting to undermine the value of the agreements accepted and signed by the highest representatives of the 35 countries participating in the Conference.³ This is a completely understandable and normal phenomenon. The Conference and its results are the elements of a process which is developing in Europe. It would be naive to expect that the favorable conclusion of the Conference will induce its opponents to give up their attempts to torpedo the process of detente, and to implement honestly the resolutions adopted in Helsinki. It was possible to call the Conference only in conditions of detente. The CSCE

was therefore a link and its results are an important stage in the process of detente.

The CSCE was concluded successfully because essential positive changes have occurred in the international situation, these changes "representing--according to the document of the 29 communist and workers parties adopted at the Berlin conference--the result of the shifts in the structure of forces in favor of peace, democracy, national liberation, independence and socialism, the result of the intensifying struggle of the masses and the broad socio-political forces."⁴ The Berlin document states simultaneously that the effectiveness of the determinations achieved in Helsinki will depend decidedly on how consistently and strictly all the participating countries observe the 10 approved principles and "incorporate in life all resolutions of the Final Act which constitute a uniform whole."⁵ In other words, the resolutions of the CSCE attest to progress in the area of detente; but only an honest and consistent implementation of the resolutions of the Conference will make this process lasting, universal and general.

This process consists of a number of elements. Preparations for the CSCE and the debate which included three successive stages were important. Now an extremely important factor in ensuring further progress of detente is the implementation of resolutions of the Final Act. It should be noted here that in the statements of the leaders of states during the third stage of the Helsinki Conference and later, in various official documents of the governments of countries participating in the Conference, a positive attitude was expressed with regard to the adopted resolutions, and the will to respect and implement them.⁶ This is a significant fact. For it proves--regardless of the true intentions of the various states--that a new atmosphere is taking shape in Europe in which the policy of detente and cooperation, postulated by the socialist countries for many years, now belongs to the officially proclaimed purposes of all the governments of Europe and North America.

At the same time, however, anxiety is caused by the fact that in many countries, in the first place the United States and the FRG, the theses are propagated that the socialist countries under the guise of detente tend to change the structure of power, especially military power, in their favor, and on this basis the purposefulness of the policy of detente is being questioned. Opinions are expressed that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has failed to speed up the process of detente and that even in a year after the conclusion of the Conference this process has slowed down. Do such opinions correspond to the factual situation? It is understandable that the answer to this question depends largely on the expectations which individual countries associate with the implementation of the CSCE resolutions.

Various Purposes and Expectations--Common Platform

An authoritative expression of purposes and intentions, expectations and hopes are the attitudes of countries outlined during the third stage of the CSCE in Helsinki. An analysis of these materials leads to the assumption

that the countries participating in the conference in accepting the new code of relations that regulate cooperation in the area of politics, economy, science and culture, education, information and interhuman relations, which expresses "something more than good intentions" and constitutes a "moral obligation," were not giving up their political goals. To the contrary, they were declaring their wish to implement them even after the Conference. The new element was the obligation of the states to observe the determined principles, to proceed in accordance with the CSCE resolutions.

There obviously remain differences determined by the distinctness of systems, political strategy and the role and place of individual countries in contemporary Europe. They also project upon a different understanding of certain formulations of the CSCE Final Act. However, the ranking and importance of this document are defined not so much by divergent interpretations--easy to anticipate and certainly not a rarity in the international application practice of bilateral and multilateral acts--as by the ability of the 35 countries to work out, the existing controversies notwithstanding, common foundations for further development of relations. The adjustment of a document which regulates the most delicate problems--concerning ideology or fields which belong traditionally to the exclusive domestic competence of a state (information on maneuvers, resolving humanitarian problems)--attests to the real intention of the countries to ensure a continuity of the process of detente and to prevent a return to the state of permanent tension and cold war. This particularly emphasizes the importance of principles contained in the Final Act which--as stated in Helsinki by U.S. President Gerald Ford²⁶--"are something more than the lowest common denominator of government attitudes." Reality has confirmed the thesis that the accepted solution expresses not only a compromise at minimal level, but rather the optimum political will of the states, couched in a form which was possible in the specific historical moment, taking into account the interests of countries with different systems, varying potential, members of political-military and economic groups, as well as countries which remain outside the alliances which exist in Europe.

The general view prevailed in Helsinki that the resolutions of the Final Act "will have to be concretized," and that "their value will be commensurate with the degree of their application."²⁷ The Conference--according to the words of the chancellor of Austria--closed the first and decisive stage of the policy of detente. After the CSCE--said Bruno Kreisky--the policy of detente became a reality and will have to register visible and concrete results.²⁸

On the first anniversary of signing the Final Act, it is worth recalling that its signatories had no illusions as to the possibility of an immediate change of the situation in Europe. "After decades of confrontation--stated in Helsinki the FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt--the era of cooperation cannot come within a single night. A single impulse is not enough for the process of detente, but this process requires the constant cooperation of all to move forward in a continuing way."²⁹ A sober approach was also taken by

the president of the United States when he stated that "we cannot expect miracles," but a steady "gradual progress, step by step."

Yet, it is a fact that great meetings of leaders create the atmosphere and mood of expectation and hope for radical and total changes, or even for the formation of a new international system. The opinions and appraisals expressed after the Helsinki Conference appear to indicate that great experts and students of international relations are also subject to such moods. This was confirmed to a certain extent by the course of the international symposium in Torun (2-3 July 76) on the subject: Europe after CSCE. Regional and Global Problems of Security and Disarmament.³⁰ The symposium assembled prominent scientists and experts in the field of security and cooperation from 17 countries of Europe and the United States. There was much skepticism among the Western participants of the meeting. It was stated that although it is possible to register many positive factors in the development of the situation after the Helsinki Conference, it is disappointing that no qualitative improvement has occurred in the East-West relations, and even that the dynamics of the detente processes have noticeably diminished. The West suffers from a peculiar "weariness of detente"--according to the representatives of Western European and American international relations research centers. "The CSCE did not create a new European security system--stated C. Bertram, director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies--but it rather confirmed the existence of the old (system); contrary to the expectations of some and the fears of others, the alliance systems were maintained and even strengthened in the course of negotiations--as exemplified in the West by the intensification of the successfully pursued policy coordination, not only within the Atlantic alliance but, particularly, among the member countries of the European community. The Final Act did not introduce any new quality into the European relations on the East-West line." Bertram made the reservation that the expectation of such changes after the CSCE would have been a misunderstanding; purposes which the countries did not project cannot be taken as a measure of the success and influence of the results of the Conference on the situation in Europe.

It is worth saying on this occasion that, as a rule, international conferences or documents, even the momentous ones, do not create a new situation and do not change the structure of forces; they can reflect a changed situation, obstruct or favor the shaping of a new international system--set forth common goals and define the frames of rivalry, regulate and sanction the principles and standards of behavior for the states. There is no doubt that in this respect the CSCE has occupied an entirely new place in the history of contemporary Europe. Today, in a year's perspective, we may state that:

In the first place, all countries of Europe, as well as the United States and Canada, have affirmed in various forms their will to observe the rules determined in Helsinki, in spite of the fact that the Final Act did not create any formal obligations on the international law platform (although several provisions of this document, in particular the declaration of principles, have an international legal character binding the countries on the basis of the UN Charter and other bilateral or multilateral agreements).

Secondly, the East-West dialog, conducted with such an intensity during the Conference, is being continued at various levels in both bilateral and multilateral modes. There still remain, of course, many unresolved problems concerning particularly general European cooperation or the reduction of armaments. But the fact that talks are in preparation aimed at resolving these problems, or that they are already a subject of negotiation, mitigates the prevailing controversies as a source of tension.

Thirdly, in laying the foundations for an enduring normalization of relations among countries of various social systems, the resolutions of the Conference constituted a summing up--on a political and multilateral platform--of the process of bilateral treaty regulation in central Europe of matters connected with the final recognition by the FRG of the effects of World War II. Consequently, the security of Europe is no longer identified, either in the East or in the West, with the resolution of the so-called German problem. The relationship of the two German states based on peaceful coexistence and its development in accordance with jointly accepted premises is tantamount to an enduring solution of this problem. For the definite closing of the provisional period on German soil represents an important peace stabilizing factor in Europe as a whole.

In the fourth place, the observance of the determinations of the Final Act constitutes today a criterion of honesty in the behavior of countries and of the adoption by them of the principles of good faith.

A year, or even 2 or 3 years, is too short a period in international relations to compare or measure the results of a country's policy. It is also known that country representatives, appointed by the ministers of foreign affairs, will meet in Belgrade in 1977. The purpose of that meeting was defined in the CSCE resolutions as follows: "To carry out a more profound exchange of views on the effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and the tasks set forth by the Conference, as well as--in the context of problems discussed by the Conference--on improving their mutual relations, strengthening the security and developing cooperation in Europe, and on developing the process of detente in the future."³¹ The idea of the conference in Belgrade is now the subject of a lively discussion in political and scientific centers. Certain differences of opinion in this matter were revealed already during the preparation of appropriate provisions of the Final Act.³² They can be reduced to the question of whether the exchange of views in Belgrade should take the form of mutual accusations and polemics on the extent and ways and means of implementation of the Final Act, or whether the discussion should be constructive and in carrying out appraisal should search for new ways of improving relations, expanding cooperation and strengthening security in Europe.

From Intention to Action

The implementation of the Final Act includes the popularization of this document, its interpretation and the application of principles and recommendations contained therein.

Popularization. On the motion of Italy, presented during the second stage of the CSCE in Geneva on behalf of a group of EEC member countries, a provision was added to the Final Act according to which the text of this document was to be "published, propagated and popularized as widely as possible" in all countries participating in the Conference. The Western countries considered the realization of this provision as a specific test of the attitude of the socialist countries to the resolutions of the Conference and, in particular, as a test of the realization of "the free access to information." It turned out in practice that in all socialist countries the complete text of the document was published in mass editions immediately after the conclusion of the CSCE. In the USSR, the CSSR and the GDR, the complete text of the Final Act appeared in the daily press.³³ In Poland--regardless of the extensive press information and the publication of the document--the CSCE results were broadly introduced to the programs of higher education schools and to mass education.³⁴

However, only in a few Western countries (Finland, for example) did the government institutions attempt to make the text of the Final Act accessible to the general public on a mass scale. In the majority of the EEC and NATO countries (including Italy, which initiated the relevant provision), the document was printed in limited editions, in parliamentary bulletins, and was accessible in practice to experts only.³⁵

The mass communication media did not mention the results of the conference or discussed only certain fragments, mainly the resolutions concerning "basket³" and the means of building confidence in the military field. In effect, the societies of some Western countries received only a distorted picture of the Conference results. Thus, the first test of honest implementation of the resolutions of the Conference, which was the popularization of its provisions, has turned out favorably for the socialist countries.

Interpretation. Immediately after the conclusion of the Helsinki Conference, a number of official enunciations and scientific and journalistic commentaries on the Final Act as a whole or some of its provisions appeared in the East and West.³⁶ The subject of considerations is both the contents and the form of the Final Act, its political and legal character, and the matter of the legal force of the adopted resolutions. Richard Frelék anticipated that "the matter of international legal force of the Helsinki resolutions will certainly be taken up by experts on treaty law. It may be assumed that they will express a variety of opinions depending on their attitude to the Conference and--as it happens in life--on political demand. To us, the legal force of resolutions signed in Helsinki is beyond doubt."³⁷ As a matter of fact, the problem of the legal character of the Final Act provisions arouses a lively interest of experts. Although there is a unanimity that the Helsinki resolutions are not a treaty in the sense of the Vienna Convention concerning the law of international treaties³⁸, but this does not forejudge the question whether the provisions of the Final Act are of international legal significance and, if so, what significance. Interpretative arguments as to whether all provisions of the Final Act are equally valid exert even greater practical influences upon the implementation of the resolutions.

The majority of Polish writers believe that the Final Act is an international agreement of a political character, which also has valuable legal significance although its signatories did not consider it an international treaty in the strict sense of the word.³⁹ The legal significance of the Helsinki resolutions ensues from the fact that in the declaration of principles the states have affirmed only the basic set of norms whose international legal character is not disputed by anybody. The recommendations and postulates contained in the Final Act are also of essential importance in the process of negotiating agreements designed to concretize the provisions adopted in Helsinki. It should be added that Poland--as other socialist countries--considers all resolutions of the Final Act as a uniform whole.

In many Western countries the prevailing approach to both these matters is different. Firstly, the fact is emphasized that the Final Act has not international legal significance.⁴⁰ Secondly, the thesis is advanced that attempts to reconcile the antagonistic attitudes of the parties were responsible for the general, vague formulation of the acceptable compromise which allows the parties too much discretion in interpretation. Thirdly, the novelty in the Helsinki resolutions consists allegedly in a few "basket³" matters and in the means of building military confidence. In effect, the importance of the adopted document was consciously played down⁴¹, or fragments were pulled out from the context of the Final Act which--as stated by Leonid I. Brezhnev at the Seventh Congress of the PZPR--"someone considers more useful to himself for tactical reasons."⁴²

These were really attempts to dispute or to introduce peculiar "corrections" to the results of the Conference after its conclusion. The initial assumption of the conference debate was to respect the distinctness of the political, social, economic and philosophic systems. Only a document elaborated on this basis could become an effective instrument of developing the process of detente.

In treating the interpretative divergencies as a normal phenomenon, it apparently should be stated that the interpretation of the Final Act, which is the guidepost for the development of security and cooperation in Europe, ought to correspond to the goals and functions which this document has to perform in the practice of international relations.

Implementation. The participants of the Conference have decided that the adopted provisions will be "properly considered and implemented on three levels: a) Within the domestic competence of a state, or "in a unilateral way"; b) through negotiations with other countries, or "in a bilateral way"; c) through meetings of experts and within the framework of existing international organizations, or "in a multilateral way."

Activities were undertaken at all levels and concrete progress has been made in the implementation of goals which the countries have set for themselves in the Final Act. Of course, progress is not the same in all fields or amongst all countries.

Concluding Remarks

The outlined review and brief analysis of the state of implementation of the CSCE Final Act lead to the following conclusions:

1. The success of the Helsinki Conference has strengthened the dynamics of the detente processes in Europe which now affect all areas of relations among countries. The process of institutionalization of the cooperation between the countries of the East and the West was initiated, particularly of political and economic consultations, which contributes to the stabilization of cooperation although its extent is often unsatisfactory.
2. The present situation is transitional in character: From tension to detente, from isolation to cooperation, from confrontation--through negotiations--to a gradual slowdown of armaments and their reduction. But the initiated process of remodeling the structure of international relations has not produced as yet a new system in which the balance of power will be replaced by a balance of interests. The positive changes which have occurred in Europe are not irreversible.
3. The settlement of controversial problems in central Europe and normalization arrangements made possible the convocation and fruitful deliberations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation; the observance of principles agreed upon at the Conference and the implementation of recommendations adopted in the Final Act should establish lasting foundations for a new European system. However, the formation of this system takes place in conditions of blocs and balance of power functioning, whose maintenance is supported by centers and groups created during the cold war period.
4. The factor which determines favorable transformations in the international situation is a change in the structure of political, economic, and military forces in relations among countries, and within the framework of individual countries--the structure of social, class forces. The development of the situation in Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy) proves that peace and detente foster progress, while war and tension favor the forces of the right and reaction. But there is no automatic link between the shifting structure of forces and the shaping of a new type of relations among countries.
5. The acceptance of the CSCE Final Act by 35 countries and the affirmation of the intention to implement it do not mean that this document is considered by all members of the European community as an instrument of deepening the process of detente and cooperation. The common platform adopted in Helsinki does not mean that all governments which have accepted the provisions of the Final Act are giving up their goals which are often contradictory to the essence of this document. In effect the countries of the Atlantic alliance attempt to impose a concept of the CSCE resolutions as if these would create unilateral obligations for the socialist countries.⁷¹ The

interpretation and implementation of the Final Act are a continuation of the rivalry between different social systems. The novelty of the situation after the CSCE consists in the acceptance of a basic regulator of relations among countries--respect for the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The balance of the first year of the Final Act implementation is positive. It was a period of adaptation to new conditions. The establishment of a new system of security and cooperation will be a complex process, and its forms will be pragmatic and functional. The CSCE Final Act is a program for the construction of a new system which requires constant efforts, although its formation will be possible rather in a historical perspective than in the next few years.

FOOTNOTES

1. Compare, preamble to the CSCE Final Act, SPRAWY MIĘDZYNARODOWE, 1975, No 10.
2. It should be noted here that among the first books devoted to the CSCE is the collective work of Soviet authors entitled: "European Security and Cooperation--Foundations, Problems, Perspectives," Moscow 1976. Compare also the work published by PISM [Polish Institute for International Affairs] in English, entitled: "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A Polish View," Warsaw 1976. A brief review of articles dealing with these problems--compare A.D. Rotfeld, "Conference on Security and Cooperation. Legal Problems," PANSTWO I PRAWO, 1976, No 1-2, p 73, footnote 3.
3. Compare, for example, the attitude of the Christian Democratic Party in the FRG which on 25 July 1975 called on the federal government not to sign the final documents of the CSCE [CDU/CSU Fraction in the German Bundestag of 25 July 1975], or the opinions expressed in the organ of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London (Chatham House), THE WORLD TODAY, 1975, No 9.
4. Compare the text of the document adopted at the conclusion of the conference of communist and workers parties of Europe: "For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe," (Berlin, 29-30 June 1976), TRYBUNA LUDU, 3-4 July 1976.
5. Ibid.
6. Full texts of addresses delivered during the third stage of the CSCE were published by the secretariat of the Conference in the volume: "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Stage III--Helsinki, 30 July-1 August 1975. Verbatim Records and Documents." Many signatories of the Final Act--from both the East and the West--made such

declarations on the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Conference--CSCE III, p 14. Compare the qualifications and characteristics of the Act in TRYBUNA LUDU, 2 and 3 August 1976.

7. From an address by the prime minister of the United Kingdom, Harold Wilson during the third stage of the CSCE, CSCE III, p 14. Compare the qualifications and characteristics of the Act in an article by A. Klafkowski: "The CSCE Final Act--bases of legal interpretation," SPRAWY MIĘDZYNARODOWE, 1976, No 7-8.
26. Ibid., p 132.
27. Compare the address of the president of Switzerland, P. Graber, Ibid. p 42.
28. Ibid., p 103.
29. Ibid. p 44.
30. The symposium entitled: "Europe after the CSCE, Regional and Global Problems of Security and Disarmament," was organized by the Polish Institute for International Affairs and the International Peace Institute in Vienna. The introductory addresses were delivered by the director of PISM, Dr Marian Dobrosielski; the director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Dr Christoph Bertram; and the representative of the National Defense Academy of Austria, General Wolfgang Kuntner.
31. Compare, the CSCE Final Act, part "Steps Following the Conference."
32. More in this matter--compare A. D. Rotfield: "Continuation Without Institutionalization. Forms of European Cooperation after the CSCE," SPRAWY MIĘDZYNARODOWE, 1975, No 10.
33. A. Shytikov, chairman of the Union Council of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who is also the chairman of the USSR Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe, stated in an interview for the TASS agency that the Soviet people have been acquainted with the materials from the Conference through the publication of the complete text of the Final Act by the PRAVDA and IZVIESTIA dailies. Furthermore, the USSR Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe has been explaining the results of the Helsinki Conference. See, TRYBUNA LUDU, 13 February 1976.
34. A collective work entitled "Great Peace Charter," published by the KiW [Book and Knowledge Publishing House], Warsaw, 1975, contains the complete text of the CSCE Final Act and the address by E. Gierek, chairman of the Polish delegation to the third stage of the Conference,

delivered in Helsinki, on 31 July 1975. See, also, SPRAWY MIĘDZY-NARODOWE, 1975, No 10, and the special addition to this issue entitled "The CSCE Final Act," Warsaw 1975.

35. Compare, interview with the director of the press department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V. Sofinski by TRYBUNA LUDU, 6 January 1976.
36. The bibliography of publications containing commentaries on the Final Act includes already several hundred items. We may quote as an example a series of articles published by periodicals devoted to international relations, such as MIEZDUNARODNAJA ZYZN (USSR), EUROPA-ARCHIV (FRG), DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK (GDR), MIEZDUNARODNI OTNOSZENIJE (Bulgaria) and other. Selected bibliography of the most important Polish publications on this subject, compare the already quoted work: "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A Polish View," pp 273-291.
37. R. Frelek, "Charter of Peace in Europe," NOWE DROGI, No 9, p 67.
38. In accordance with Article 2 of the Vienna Convention, the term "treaty" denotes "an international agreement concluded between countries in a written form, to which the international law is applicable, conceived either in a single document, or in two or more interconnected documents, regardless of its specific name." "Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties" (translated and edited by S. E. Nahlik), Warsaw 1971, p 24.

The countries participating in the CSCE requested the Government of Finland to transmit the text of the Final Act to the UN secretary general, but they also clearly stressed that it is not subject to registration on the basis of Article 102 of the UN Charter, which requires that the international treaties concluded by UN members are to be registered with the UN secretariat. Moreover, Finland's minister of foreign affairs, O. Mattila, stated clearly in a note of 19 September 1975, addressed to a UN secretary general, that the Final Act is not subject to registration, either in part or as a whole, "as would have been in the case of a treaty or international agreement," UN Office of Public Information, NV/464, 30 September 1975.
39. Compare, R. Bierzanek: "European Security and the UN Security System," PANSTWO I PRAWO, 1976, No 1-2; J. Symonides: "Declaration of the Principles of Inter-State Relations CSCE," SPRAWY MIĘDZYNARODOWE, 1975, No 10; A. D. Rotfeld: "Conference on Security and Cooperation."
40. In particular, attention is called to this fact by authors in the FRG; compare, for example, K. Blech: "The CSCE as a Step in the Process of Detente," EUROPA-ARCHIV, 1975, No 22, p 686.

41. Thus, for example, the British commentator Richard Davy wrote that the enacted texts "will probably have little or no legal force at all," "The CSCE Summit," THE WORLD TODAY, 1975, No 9, p 353. A similar attitude was expressed by Professor J. Freymond from the University Institute of Higher International Studies in Geneva during a symposium on the subject of radio-television information exchange between states with different social systems, in the light of the CSCE Final Act, which was held in Krakow on 6-7 May 1976. During the aforementioned symposium in Torun, some participants from NATO countries also expressed the view that "ambiguity of formulations facilitates the agreement on a text but makes its implementation difficult."
42. TRYBUNA LUDU, 10 December 1975.
71. An example of the double standard applied by the NATO countries was provided by the accusations directed against the USSR in connection with the assistance granted the Government of Angola, as if this action were contrary to the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs, at a parallel open pressure and economic blackmail applied by the United States, the FRG, France and United Kingdom to keep the Italian Communist Party from joining the government after the June elections. "There is even no need to prove that such interference is clearly contrary to the Helsinki Final Act," stated L. Brezhnev in an interview for the PRAVDA daily on 30 July 1976.

1670
CSO: 2600

QUESTIONS ON PROTECTION OF MILITARY SECRETS ANSWERED

Prague ZAPISNIK in Czech No 21, 8 Oct 76 pp 12-13

[Interview with Lt Col JUDr Bohuslav Plasil of the Army Advocate General's Office: "October Dialogues"]

[Text] [Question] Not even in recent years, when the peace program adopted at the 24th CPSU Congress scored important successes, has there been noticed a decline in interest of the intelligence services from imperialist states in the military potential of our country as part of the world socialist system and especially in the CSLA [Czechoslovak People's Army] as part of the military-political grouping of the socialist armies--of the Warsaw Pact. The NATO command is making a systematic effort to procure and perfect its information from all areas of life, training, work and the building up of our army. Not even the consolidation of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems permits our relaxation of vigilance and watchfulness. In addition, the protection of secret information has, in recent years, become an important part of protecting the interests and security not only of our republic, but of the entire socialist world system. How does our judicial system react to this existing situation, Comrade Lt Col?

[Answer] All these facts and our experiences from 1968-1969 when the danger of secret information disclosure for our socialist state was underrated, led, at the end of 1971, to the promulgation of law No 102/71 of the SBIRKA on The Protection of State Secrets and of the decree of the CSSR government No 148/71 of the SBIRKA on The Protection of Economic and Military Secrets. These norms constitute the legal basis of the effective and consistent protection of secret information both from organs of foreign intelligence services and from other unauthorized persons.

To insure the fulfillment of the tasks deriving from these and other legal norms, the minister of national defense published in 1975 service regulation MNO-7-1 (legal) about the protection of secret information in the CSLA which is obligatory for all soldiers, civilian employees, military administrations and workers of national enterprises under the jurisdiction of the MNO [Ministry of National Defense].

[Question] Of course, the duty to observe military secrets is not new in our legal system.

[Answer] It is not. And it is also nothing new or special in the legal system of other countries, be they socialist or capitalist. Not only we but also our potential adversaries have learned a lesson from history which knows of more than one war or battle lost only because one warring side succeeded in uncovering the intentions, plans, forces and means of the other side.

In our army, the requirement of great vigilance and watchfulness and of the strict observation of military secrets is specifically anchored in the military oath, in the fundamental duties of all soldiers mentioned in the Internal Service Order, in the Disciplinary Order among the postulates of military discipline and in other service regulations, orders and ordinances.

[Question] Secret information has different degrees of gravity and is of different importance to our socialist state and army. How is this reflected in the legal norms?

[Answer] Depending on the importance of the secret information our laws differentiate between 1) state secrets and 2) economic and military secrets. A state secret is everything which for important political, military and economic reasons should remain concealed from unauthorized persons in the interest of our republic. The facts whose disclosure to an unauthorized person or a foreign power could cause especially serious political, military or economic harm to our state are designated as state secrets of special importance.

An economic secret is everything of importance for the economic activity and which, in the public interest, is to remain concealed from unauthorized persons.

A military secret includes important facts connected with the activities of national committees, courts, armed services, armed corps, other state organs, state, cooperative, economic, or social organizations which in the public interest should remain concealed from unauthorized persons.

In practice, there is no sharp distinction between facts concealed for important reasons of state and those concealed in the public interest. By gathering data which in themselves are of small importance, an unauthorized person can even uncover an important state secret. We are therefore not underrating the protection of even less important information.

[Question] What category do the so-called military secrets then fall into?

[Answer] Included are all facts concealed in the CSLA which by their importance can constitute a subject of a state secret (possibly of a state

secret of special importance) or the subject of an economic or military secret. Such secret information in the CSLA, for example, is the organization of the CSLA, its numerical strength, the disposition of units, military installations, equipment, armaments, outfitting, documents dealing with combat and political training, disposition, tasks and production potentials of enterprises working for the armed services, etc. Of course, included is also "less important" information for example about unit commanders, the performance of guard or sentry duty, disciplinary practices in units, the training of soldiers, where and when it takes place, etc.

[Question] Who is considered an unauthorized person from the viewpoint of the protection of secret information?

[Answer] Anyone not authorized to come into contact with the secret information. For a soldier this means not only an unknown person or a curious friend but also a member of his family and in some instances even a soldier serving with him in the same unit, or his superior or someone of higher rank. Even soldiers in basic service, during the performance of specific duties and specific functions, become acquainted with information accessible to only a strictly limited number of persons. Every soldier, be he in basic service or a professional, is allowed to come in contact only with facts necessary for the discharge of his function or the fulfillment of imposed tasks. Therein lies one of the basic principles of the protection of secret information in the CSLA.

[Question] Of course, this is not always the way soldiers in basic military service understand things.

[Answer] Not only soldiers in basic military service. Some people believe that in the times of intelligence gathering satellites, widespread tourist traffic etc., there is nothing that can be concealed from foreign intelligence services. Of course, this is an erroneous assumption. The entire system of work of foreign intelligence services directed against socialist countries demonstrates that we can protect our secrets if we observe consistently all prescribed measures. Incorrect is also the belief held by some of the soldiers in the basic military service that only members of the command corps come in contact with military secrets in time of peace or that only information deposited in the safes of commanders is secret and that everybody can know what is known to an ordinary soldier. Even facts such as the official name of the unit, the name of the commanding officer or whether the soldiers are satisfied or dissatisfied with the food are of interest to foreign intelligence services.

[Question] What is the most frequent method of disclosing or endangering a military secret by soldiers in basic service?

[Answer] The greatest danger constitutes the loquacity of some soldiers in the most inappropriate situations, for example in the pub, at a dance, in a train, during a visit with friends, etc. Boasting and the endeavor to appear interesting are frequently stimulated by the intake of alcohol.

Many a military secret was disclosed in letters which soldiers in basic military service sent to their parents, wives, sweethearts and friends. Secrecy is also being endangered during the use of technical means of communication in the discharge of duty, by taking notes during military instruction on loose sheets of paper, etc.

Some soldiers also do not fully realize that the obligation to observe silence about secret information continues even after they are discharged from active service into the reserve.

[Question] How do our laws punish people who betrayed the obligation to protect secret information?

[Answer] All citizens are obligated to protect secret information irrespective of how they come into contact with it, that is, whether it was confided to them, or whether they gained their knowledge by accident or even illegally. Our laws punish disclosing or endangering secret information--according to the degree of its gravity--by severe penalties. For example, the intentional disclosure of a state secret to a foreign intelligence service can be prosecuted as a punishable act of espionage with a jail sentence of 10 to 15 years and under especially incriminating circumstances (for example when the crime committed was of an extensive scope, when the state secret revealed was of special importance, etc.) by a jail sentence of 12 to 15 years or by death. The intentional disclosure of a state secret to another unauthorized person is punishable by a jail sentence of 6 months to 3 years and under especially incriminating circumstances by 1 to 5 years. The intentional disclosure of an economic or military secret to an unauthorized person is punishable by a jail sentence of 1 year and the disclosure of such secrets to a foreign power by a jail sentence of up to 3 years.

Secret information, however, must also be protected from disclosure or from the danger of disclosure by negligence, loquacity, loss, etc. The person, for example, who by negligence causes the disclosure of a state secret which he was especially admonished to keep, or of a state secret of special importance to an unauthorized person, can be punished by a jail sentence of up to 2 years. Similarly punished is also the endangering or disclosure of a state secret to the detriment of one of the states of the world socialist system. This is a reflection of the general close relationship of socialist states in the political, military and economic sphere. The disclosure of an economic or military secret to an unauthorized person by negligence can be punished, in the case of soldiers on active duty, according to the Disciplinary Code, and in the case of civilian employees of a military administration by measures contained in the Labor Code.

[Question] What can we, in conclusion, recommend to our readers from the ranks of soldiers in basic service?

[Answer] It is not enough for the soldier dealing with secret information to observe the given principles, he must actively protect it from the danger of disclosure by another individual, be it a loquacious friend or an agent of a foreign intelligence service.

8664

CSO: 2400

EAST GERMANY

FRG PAPER DISCUSSES GDR POPULATION AND BIRTH RATE DECLINE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 26 Oct 76 p 1

[Article by Hans H. Goetz, Berlin: "Children: Investments of the GDR"]

[Text] For the economic future of the Federal Republic, a fact which is easily overlooked in the whirl of everyday politics will become increasingly important: The decline in population. Apparently, we Germans have to carry everything to an extreme: Of all countries in the world, the Federal Republic and the GDR have the lowest birth-rates. This is sufficient reason to concern oneself with the phenomenon of population and economic growth. This is the first essay of a series of articles. The second article will discuss the development in Great Britain.

The GDR is furnishing instructive evidence of the fact that a declining birth-rate and a decrease in total population does not automatically signify a decrease in the working population or reduced growth, at any rate not as far as short- and medium-term trends are concerned; measures directed to specific objectives can compensate for the consequences of the population decline.

What are the facts in the GDR? In 1950, the population was still in excess of 18 million; subsequently, during the period of more or less unimpeded border traffic, i.e. prior to the building of the Wall, it decreased to 17.1 million. Since 1962, the population figures have been showing a downward trend, fluctuating around the 17-million mark, below which they dropped for the first time in 1972. In 1975, the total population of the GDR numbered merely 16.8 million; according to experts, a decline to 16 million by 1990 is possible. And according to an investigation conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), a population decline by 280,000 to 350,000 is expected before 1980; after 1980, however, the downward trend is expected to slow down.

This development is caused by several factors: some which cannot be modified, especially if they are connected with the age structure, which is unbalanced

also in the GDR (the consequences of two wars and of the economic crisis of the 1930's); and some factors which the state is not prepared to accept, but which it is responding to with countermeasures. The GDR leadership is very much concerned about the sharply declining birthrate: During the first postwar decade, the annual birthrate in the GDR was still as high as 300,000; subsequently, the birthrate declined, at first steadily and after 1972, drastically. In 1972, the possibility of induced abortion was legalized. In addition, contraceptives have since been distributed free of charge. The result must have shocked the planners: In 1971, barely 235,000 births; in 1972, only 200,000 and in 1973 and 1974, 180,000. In 1975, 182,000 births were recorded. It remains to be seen, whether this development will continue. At any rate, the initially alarmingly high number of legal abortions has further declined. According to official sources, there is a decrease of from 10 to 12 percent annually.

This developmental discontinuity is bound to have a negative effect on the number of gainfully employed persons in the 1980's and 1990's and also in later years; but in regard to the next 10 years, the GDR can still expect a considerable increase in its working population. This is important for the leadership; for in this period which comprises two five-year plans, some of the great tasks of economic and social policy must be solved, above all the elimination of the housing shortage. For the time being, large age classes will be moving up, and the "mountain of pensioners"--a result of the large age groups born before World War I--is dwindling. According to the DIW [German Institute for Economic Research], today every fifth GDR citizen is a pensioner: "No other country in the world has as high a share of pensioners." In view of the low rents, however, the financial burden in the GDR cannot be compared with that of the Federal Republic, especially since in the GDR there are no progressive pensions or annual pension adjustments.

However, since the onset of the population decline, i.e. since 1960, the working population has been steadily increasing; from 1960 until 1965, it numbered approximately 8 million, and it has since increased to 8.4 million. However, the GDR still has manpower reserves; for example, for an advanced industrial state such as the GDR, the percentage of workers employed in agriculture is inexplicably high. The only explanation is the relatively low productivity of labor in GDR agriculture--a result of the Marxist-Leninist agricultural policy.

The high percentage of working women is primarily responsible for the large share of gainfully employed persons in the total population. In the GDR, women make up approximately 50 percent of the working population, and since 1970, an additional 500,000 women have entered the labor market. Among the many reasons underlying this development, economic factors are the most important. The GDR family needs the wife as a contributory breadwinner; moreover, the GDR has opened up new jobs to women. All told, the employment quota of the GDR population (gainfully employed persons as a percentage of the resident population) could increase again during the next 15 years from 52 percent to approximately 58 percent.

It is understandable that the decline in the birthrate has alarmed the GDR leadership; for: "There is insufficient scientific foundation for long-range planning, if it is not possible to make reliable predictions concerning the number of future producers and consumers." In Marxist terminology, this means: "The people's reproductive behavior" is unsatisfactory and "the elementary reproduction of the population is presently no longer assured."

Instructive in this connection is an article by the competent department head in the Central State Administration for Statistics, Dr Lungwitz (WIRTSCHAFTS-WISSENSCHAFT No 4, 1974). Of course, his analysis of the situation is Marxist, i.e. he records "contradictions between the individual and social interests" which are revealed in the declining birthrate; it is therefore necessary to find "ways and means of integrating the woman's dual function as mother and working person." It is now crucially important to change the conditions which under the present circumstances have motivated the low birthrate: "For this task, the socialist society has all the prerequisites." The author notes that frequently the family income cannot keep up with the rapidly rising demands on life and that many families solve this conflict through birth control.

In the meantime, the GDR has reacted to this trend which has been manifest since 1972; and its response was quicker than would be possible in democratic states. Immediately after the ninth party congress in May 1976, the GDR presented a program stipulating a series of measures pertaining to social and wage policy; this program is clearly oriented toward demographic ends. The numerous measures, which are to promote a positive attitude toward reproduction and which provide financial assistance for the young families, immediately went into effect as of 1 July 1976. In terms of paid maternity leave and financial assistance, young mothers and young families are better off in the GDR than in the Federal Republic (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 31 May 1976 and 4 June 1976).

Nobody can predict, whether, when and how these massive material and non-material bonuses will affect the birthrate, whether they are stronger than the unsatisfied and in the Communist system obviously unsatisfiable demands of the younger consumers. Of course, every family in the GDR is free to decide when and how many children it wants to have or whether it wants any children at all. But--says Lungwitz--: "At the same time, one must continue to influence the marital partners' willingness to reproduce and one must emphasize their obligation vis-a-vis the society and the future generation."

According to Lungwitz, it is necessary to act consciously and systematically so that the number of children will ensure the reproduction of the population; the necessary preconditions are to be established. For: "Children are investments for the future."

8760
CSO: 2300

EAST GERMANY

FRG PAPER DESCRIBES HARSH GDR PRISON CONDITIONS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 26 Oct 76 p 3

[Article by Claus-Einar Langen]

[Text] There is no indication that the intensification of "disciplinary measures" which has been noticeable in GDR prisons for some time now is lessening. This intensification, which affects political prisoners more often than criminal prisoners and has starvation as one of its preferred methods, is a violation of the directives of the East Berlin "Law on the Execution of Sentences" of 12 January 1968--in its new form of 19 December 1974. Compared to what is known about treatment of political prisoners in Soviet prisons, reports coming out of the penal institutions in the GDR are equally bad. Reports of violations of prisoners' rights in the Soviet hard labor prison at Vladimir are not different from those about the penal institutions at Berlin-Rummelsburg, Brandenburg-Goerden and Cottbus.

The measure of "strict solitary confinement" and isolation in GDR prisons is not different from that used under Soviet supervision in the first few years after World War II; at times it is even harsher. The demand for proper opportunities for development and sustenance of the prisoners' physical and mental health raised in the supervisory council's directive No 19 and cosigned on 12 November 1945 by Russian Army General Sokolovskiy have not yet been met, as is made clear from the above-mentioned measures in GDR prisons. Reports of severity in carrying out sentences are confirmed by descriptions given by former prisoners and by written communications (Kassiber [thieves' jargon denoting letters smuggled out of jail]).

One of the harshest and toughest measures is "strict solitary confinement," which is often used on political prisoners who are especially vulnerable because of their political attitude. The classic isolation cells are always ready for cases of "strict solitary confinement." They are divided by iron bars reaching from wall to wall and from floor to ceiling. In the prison at Cottbus prisoners have no other place to sit during the day than the bucket provided for their physical needs. A similar situation exists

in the prison at Berlin-Rummelsburg which is one of the largest institutions in the GDR where, in addition to the bucket, seating is provided by a board fastened to the wall. The toilet, located outside the bars, may be used in the morning and evening only. The amount of food rations for prisoners is severely reduced and the drastically reduced portions are now the same for all prisoners in the GDR.

Every third day a prisoner receives a simple hot meal. On each day in between he receives 200 grams of bread and half a liter of tea or malt coffee. The hard bed consisting of a wooden board with wool blanket is removed or folded up against the wall each morning. No religious literature, newspapers or books are given to the prisoners.

In Cottbus the windows of solitary confinement cells are darkened so that only a small amount of daylight can come in. A 75-watt lightbulb keeps burning until bedtime. The cells are also inadequately ventilated.

The regulations of Article 36 of the law on carrying out punishment state that strict solitary confinement must not last longer than 21 days, but this is disregarded in GDR prisons by imposing two consecutive 21-day sentences. Between the two terms, the confinement is interrupted for 1 day when nonworking prisoners receive food rations of category A. When the Soviet occupation forces were in charge, there was an interruption of from 2 to 4 days between two 21-day solitary confinement terms which were rarely imposed.

In the prison at Brandenburg-Goerden, which reputedly has 3,000 inmates, prisoners who refuse to comply with the work assignment required by law are punished by two terms of 21 days of strict solitary confinement. A man who was a prisoner at Brandenburg-Goerden for about 2 years stated in a report given to the "Work Group 13 August" that "a total of 70 prisoners, most of them political inmates, have endured this punishment."

Reduction of food rations is not mentioned in the Law on Execution of Sentences of the GDR. It must, therefore, be considered as an arbitrary measure, a kind of torture by starvation. Nor does this law indicate which of the prisoners' rights or functions are suspended during solitary confinement. (In the prisons of the FRG, beginning 1 January 1976 when the new Law on Execution of Sentences takes effect, there will be no more intensification of solitary confinement through the reduction of food or the deprivation of a bed. In consideration of the new law, these additional measures have already been avoided in penal institutions for about 2 years. In cases of attempted escape solitary confinement terms of 2 weeks, but without additional punishment, have been imposed; 3 weeks in cases of actual attack on correction officers.

In the prison at Nurnberg there is no solitary confinement for offenses against work assignments. However, federal regulations govern in detail the implementation of intensified solitary confinement. When in the extreme case of solitary confinement intensification a prisoner is deprived

of his morning, noon and evening meals, he must "daily receive 700 grams of bread and the usual beverages in sufficient quantity." According to implementation directives the intensified measures are interrupted every 3d day. Even during strict solitary confinement, the prisoner can receive religious literature for the first 7 days, and from the 8th day on, if he wishes, reading materials in appropriate quantities, e.g., newspapers or magazines to which he subscribes!)

The list of violations of rights in GDR prisons is lengthened by the particular methods of implementing isolation terms or "separation in solitary confinement." A petition to renounce GDR citizenship made during the time of confinement in prison and the political conviction connected with such a petition alone are occasions for some prison wardens to use disciplinary measures against prisoners. Actions of this kind are contrary to the Law on Execution of Sentences of the GDR according to which nobody while serving a prison sentence "may be discriminated against because of nationality, race, religion, philosophy, class affiliation or social group."

In this connection the letter sent by the 34-year-old engineer Wolfgang Defort from his solitary confinement in Cottbus to the East Berlin lawyer Vogel on 15 January 1976 should be mentioned. It is assumed that Defort, who was sentenced because of an attempt to "cross the border illegally" and for "propaganda against the state" is presently in the Brandenburg-Goerden prison. In his letter to lawyer Vogel, Defort writes that on 14 August 1975 he had been put "without any indication of the length of time (of his solitary confinement) into this darkened, humid, cold...cage. Besides, I am being tortured solely because of my conviction, because I expressed my opinion--humiliated, disgraced, derided and punished by starvation, cold, and solitary confinement."

The daily food ration in solitary confinement consists, beside the noon meal, of 500 grams of bread, 10 grams of butter and 15 grams of margarine, a thin slice of sausage and a small amount of jam. The purchase of additional food is forbidden in most cases. As for fresh fruit and vegetables, the prisoners at Cottbus received in the course of 1 year eight apples, four tomatoes, cucumber salad twice and two oranges at Christmas. After their solitary confinement term prisoners are reported to be "very emaciated and only shadows of their former selves."

There is evidently no regulation that will permit starvation diets to be used as additional punishment during solitary confinement. The question arises, however, whether the elasticity of the Law on Execution of Sentences does not encourage violations of general human rights norms. The law of 12 January 1968 provides that as one of their rights prisoners are entitled to "proper diet." In the first implementation directive of 25 March 1975, however, the principle of "group rations" is mentioned. "Proper diet" is mentioned only in connection with "work compensation."

Some political prisoners may go too far. During the 1950's it was the will to survive prison which directed to a large degree the attitude and measure of resistance. An important maxim during imprisonment was: The time of imprisonment is the time of others, not my own.

HUNGARY

KISZ CRITICIZED FOR FAILURE TO POLITICIZE YOUTH

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 8 Oct 76 p 3

[Article by B. Andras Balint: "Apathy"]

[Text] The age of prejudices and rigid rejection is, fortunately, past. Today no one is scandalized by seeing a boy with long hair and no one draws far-reaching conclusions from the fact that someone appears at work or school in jeans and jacket. We are slowly getting used to loud pop music, girls in maxi dresses and earth shoes.

In a word the popular idea of youth has changed in the course of the past decade. Adults (parents, teachers and employers) have discovered that although the youth try to be different from the older generations in externals and in behavior they identify with them in their aspirations and largely identify with them in their goals for society. They work and study and amuse themselves--and prepare themselves for the time when they can take in hand the guidance of the country.

But... let us stop a moment. Much too much has been said about the above commonplaces without our having convinced ourselves of their truth. Is the whole thing only a naive optimistic way of speaking? Because it is true that a large part of the youth take an honest position in work and study but do they have country-building plans? We do not hear much about that. Or are they being carefully secretive about them until they suddenly bring them forth unexpectedly? I do not know. But one thing is certain, that their ideas in this regard have not yet been brought to my attention, not individually or as a group.

In any case many people over 30 do not know if there is any significance to the politicization of the youth. This is proven by that survey which the Mass Communications Research Center conducted among adults to find out what their opinion was about the organized political activity of teenagers and 20-year-olds, how they saw the function of the KISZ in contemporary Hungarian society. I know that the replies given to public opinion research cannot at all give a reassuring answer to whether or not young

people take seriously their social role, but they can cast light on what they have proven in this area to the older generation.

Not too much, if you please. The survey shows that those over 30 are very skeptical of the KISZ and of the work of the federation. They see its place in the national mass organizations structure only hazily and they know little about the events of the May congress. They have a rather paltry idea about the life of the organizations in the places of work, too. They have heard that the KISZ secretary is a member of the factory quadrangle but no one mentioned whether or not he had any voice in decisions. This is probably because in most enterprises not much attention is paid to the opinion of the secretary. The majority of those questioned (workers, peasants, intellectuals, party members and non-party people) definitely stated that the opinion of the KISZ need not be taken into consideration in setting wages and rewards. They did recognize to some extent the political educational function of the youth organization but they did not know much about its interest-defending tasks and community-forming goals.

They had heard about the conditions for membership but only one-third of them were of the opinion that the KISZ placed political conditions before the applicants. According to half of those responding what was important is that the KISZ member be respectable, not steal or cheat or lie. According to 14 percent of them there are no criteria at all for admission, anybody who applies gets his membership book.... And finally there were questions as to why the larger part of the youth were not members of the organization and why the membership was only moderately satisfied with KISZ activities. The answer to both questions was the same--KISZ itself could hardly be the cause.

And here we should stop and think a minute again. We know that the politicizing, educating and interest-defending role of the federation is much more significant than those interviewed knew; it is probable that news of the efforts and the achievements had not reached them. Why? Because propaganda was not effective enough. He who wants to can learn about the national KISZ programs and actions but who reports to the older people about enterprise or place-of-residence events? Of course, one cannot explain with the lack of propaganda the skeptical answers or why virtually every person questioned showed a cool apathy about the youth federation. (And why do the great majority of the adults talk this way? And they do speak this way; the author himself has been convinced of it innumerable times....)

It cannot be the task of so brief an article to render an account of the weaknesses and faults of the KISZ. But is an obligation to call the attention of those responsible (primarily the place of work, city and town KISZ leaders) to the fact that they should pay attention to the

results of the cited survey and to the opinions of adults in general about the KISZ and so organize the youth so as not to forget for a minute that in 10 or 20 years country-building cares really will fall on the shoulders of all of them. So they should try to win a greater voice now in the affairs of their narrower environment. And at the same time they should win within the frameworks of the KISZ greater recognition than heretofore among adults.

It will not be an easy task. The adult society has accepted the long hair and the beat music but now new prejudices are in the process of being formed....

8984

CSO: 2500

HUNGARY

OVERTIME, SECONDARY JOBS ADVERSELY AFFECT LABOR EFFICIENCY

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 9 Oct 76 p 3

[Article by Gabor Imre: "Equal?"]

[Text] This time we do not want to give good advice about useful ways to use free time. What we are brooding about is whether it was enough to set down in the Constitution the right of citizens to rest and culture. Comparing the legal declarations of the laws with reality convinces us, unfortunately, that it was not enough. Nor was it enough to legally limit working time, nor to guarantee paid leave, nor to expand public culture if a large part of the people (maybe the larger part) do not or cannot take advantage of these rights and opportunities.

We consider decreasing working time to be among our most significant social achievements. Beginning with 1968, first in industry and gradually in other branches and in public administration, we converted to the 44-hour work week. On the average this means 280 eight-hour work days annually. So free time increased which, in the words of Marx, is equal to "an increase in the time serving the full development of the individual." But is it equal to that? It depends on what the increased free time is used for.

Assistant professor Imre Szabo writes in TARSADALMI SZEMLE: "Today a great number of people spend a significant part of their free time working...so actually they have only enough free time remaining for regeneration, and some not even that."

The statement cuts to the quick but it is not difficult to become convinced of its truth. We all know the signs. The workers do overtime in the factory, they undertake industrial service work outside the factory, they commute daily or weekly and many spend their annual leave working in agriculture or spend the weekend in their own little gardens. The intellectuals take second jobs, do special work, or have a private practice. I know a very old artisan whose shop is open even Sunday morning. A large part of the free time of women is taken up with housework. And then there are Communist Saturdays and social work for community development.

In agriculture the large-scale organization of work and mechanization have thus far at most compensated for the migration and aging of the labor force but have not decreased worktime to any considerable degree. The workweek in the state farms is still 48 hours. The average workday in the producer cooperatives is 10-12 hours, 2 and a half hours a day are spent on the household plot, and in more than half of the cooperative farms the annual working time of the workers corresponds to 350 eight-hour workdays. "expanded shifts in the fields," we can read in the papers. And there is more. We can read in NOK LAPJA, for example, that a good number of the mothers getting child care aid are doing work at home, sewing or cleaning. Our pension system guarantees a tranquil old age but a large part of the pensioners also work, production calls them and awaits them.

Has there been a mistake somewhere? It may be that there were mistakes, too, but the situation is there and necessary and can hardly be changed in a short time. The causes are rather well known, too; above all the relative and absolute manpower shortage. But not only that. Needs and demands have increased explosively and the possibilities for satisfying them are a good bit behind them.

In a law-like manner, or almost in a law-like manner, people work in their free time and in their retirement because they want to earn more money. Rest is a right but not an obligation. Not only is it impossible to forbid doing work in free time but it would not be useful independent of whether a person is "driving himself" for a bigger piece of bread, a better apartment, a car, or merely more mugs of beer. It is a praiseworthy thing if some nursery is finished earlier as a result of social work, if the sidewalks are finished sooner, if the parks are green more quickly. Often the production plans could not be fulfilled without overtime. Without private work many services would simply fail. Without the aid offered at peak times in agriculture we could not get in the crops. Without the work done on the household plots and supplementary farms there would be less meat, milk and vegetables.

So it is obvious that at this time the work done in free time not only satisfies personal needs but really satisfies social needs, too. Despite this we must face the fact that the burning manpower shortage is simply devouring a part of our social achievements. We can hardly change this situation overnight. Over the long range, however, it must be changed. Forward-looking and more efficient manpower management solutions cannot be postponed for long because the harmful consequences are too obvious.

Even today the work done in free time is holding back production in a direct manner. One of the participants in a debate held in the editorial offices of TARSADALMI SZEMLE pointed out that some groups of workers

"are interested in a work productivity level which will permit them to recover from the exertions of private work done in the evenings or on weekends...." Of course this is true not only in the factories.

Over the long range the self-exploitation carried out in free time will undermine the health of the workers. The lack of rest and the chronic fatigue obviously decrease the efficiency of work. There is less time for culture, amusement, family life and child rearing. In the final analysis, to use the words of Marx, the "saving" of the time available for development of the personality "will have an effect on the productivity of work"--but with a reversal of sign. In other words, if there is no time for the swift improvement of the general and professional culture of the workers then the effort spent to improve the technical level of industry and agriculture will have been in vain. In this way the circle can easily close and the work done in free time can become a brake on our economic growth and social progress.

It is time for us to think about these interdependencies.

8984

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HUNGARY

CRIME PREVENTION AMONG YOUTH SURVEYED

Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 31 Oct 76 p 21

[Article by Tamas Alaksza: "Crime Prevention--Youth--A Downward Trend"]

[Text] The crime wave, the increasing ratio of juvenile crime, is connected with the development of society, the economy and technology. For this reason some consider it unavoidable. "Juvenile crime is a normal phenomenon insofar as it corresponds to the structural state of the industrialized society," writes R. Konig in "Sociologie der Jugendkriminalitat" (FRG).

This summary opinion, however, is called into question by the internal movement of society. It is true that technological development creates new opportunities for crime and new methods of crime (auto theft, airplane hijacking, bank robbing, smuggling alcohol--in the America of the 1920's--and use of synthetic narcotics--today) but in itself technical progress and urbanization do not mean the end of the old norms, morals, conditioning and ways of thinking. (A gypsy woman married off her 12 year old daughter for money. When she was brought to account under criminal law she could not understand it. According to her best knowledge and according to her own moral code she saw nothing objectionable in the matter.) At the same time, depending on the social system, the reaction of society and of the law enforcement organs and the possibilities for their reaction do differ in regard to criminals, even if the police methods seem to be the same.

In the Wake of a Debate

In 1962-1963 there was a great debate in the columns of the Hungarian papers about whether Hungarian young people were hooligans. The debate largely coincided with a certain increase in juvenile crime, with the appearance of the "galeris"--hooligan gangs. These galeris did not resemble the vagabond bands of children in the confused periods after the war. The members were bound together not by hunger but by the demand to belong somewhere, the demand for freedom (libertinism?). Association with those of similar age replaced the loosened family contacts. (According to a survey of Budapest

youth brought to trial in 1974, 53 percent of the culprits did not live in complete families and 17 percent were wards of the state.)*

Since then the debate has been concluded and the ratio of galeri crime has radically decreased. But one must count on some resurgence. An interesting lesson is provided by the ratio of provincial youth among juveniles brought to account in the capital (in the years 1973-1974). One-fifth of them were not permanent residents of Budapest, they commuted or migrated. Those who moved to the capital, for study or jobs, often had difficulty adapting to their new environment in the workers' barracks, student halls or sublet rooms. The lack of parental discipline and association with new and unsuitable friends caused problems from them. It was easier for them to leave their jobs or schools and they became vagabonds more quickly.

The galeris, even if they are not associations organized for criminal purposes, can soon become criminal gangs. The older, "qualified" criminals naturally become the leaders of such groups. "They exploit the natural desire for adventure springing from adolescent age, their undeveloped moral feeling, the encouragement given by the group, the responsibility-decreasing effect of which is well known." (Jozsef Molnar: "Galeribunozes" [Galeri Crime].)

In any case it is justified that the police organs watch the galeris and disband them. The galeris and the disbanding of the galeris come and go, but an increasingly favorable picture is shown by the past 15 years. The number of galeris disbanded and, in parentheses, the number of galeri members, have developed as follows: 1961, 119 (1,825); 1963, 122 (2,014); 1966, 45 (525); 1968, 47 (993); 1974, 41 (676); and 1975, 19 (287). It is a fact worthy of note that 13 of the galeris disbanded in 1975, for example, were criminal galeris as compared to 22 in 1974 and the number of active criminals was 125 as compared to 277 the year before. The majority of the galeri members punished (179) were young adults and this also proves that the galeri creates a dangerous situation for adolescents. Analyzing 500 charge sheets Dr Imre Toth and Dr Jozsef Meszaros have established that almost 30 percent of the juveniles committed their crimes in conjunction with adults.

* The sources of these data quoted below (without attribution) are a study by Dr Imre Toth and Dr Jozsef Meszaros titled "A fiatalok bűnéhez vezető út" [Concerning the Situation of Juvenile Crime] and the data collected by the Juvenile and Child Care Department of the Budapest Municipal Police Headquarters.

Juvenile Criminals in Budapest in the years 1974 and 1975

Category	1974		1975	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total perpetrators	1,238	100.0	1,076	100.0
Boys	997	80.5	923	85.8
Girls	241	19.5	153	14.2
Living with divorced parent	223	18.0	217	20.2
Living with widowed parent	64	5.2	68	6.3
State ward	227	22.4	184	17.1
Alone--other	110	8.8	99	9.2
Committed crime alone	478	38.6	431	40.0
With 2 or 3 others	512	41.4	474	44.1
As member of a group	225	18.2	153	14.2
As member of a galeri	23	1.8	18	1.7

The statistical data are actually reassuring, first of all in the decreasing number of those committing crimes and in the decreasing number of the galeris which represent the greatest danger. What is it that still represents a danger and what is it that hides behind the figures?

The police measures and the disbanding of the galeris do not in themselves solve the problem; at most they disperse the groups and force them underground. But they do not remove the youths from the influence of criminal adults. In the opinion of responsible police organs the situation of galeri crime in the capital has developed favorably, but not only police efforts are needed for a further improvement in a positive trend.

Scientific analysis and a uniting of society are also needed.

The Problem of Replacements

Criminologists of the European socialist countries held their fourth congress, dealing with problems of juvenile crime, in Varna in 1975. The Hungarian report took a strong position against the opinion of Western, bourgeois criminologists that a great increase in crime is a natural concomitant of industrialization and urbanization, a sort of "natural sacrifice" on the altar of economic development. "They regard the urbanization process as a uniform and indivisible phenomenon which exercises a direct influence on the development of crime by precipitating socio-cultural conflicts and creating adaptation problems." The Hungarian examples themselves prove that the criminal dynamic is decreasing among juveniles.

The key to the problem is activating society as a whole, and it is exactly here where the socialist social system has such an obvious advantage.

The struggle against crime actually begins with the liquidation of juvenile crime, for they are the "replacements." Vagrant children without families or supervision are the first to get into a dangerous situation, a criminogenic situation. The task seems simple: One must decrease the time between the reporting of children as missing and finding them. Finding a place to spend the night and getting food are for children on the run opportunities for crime or could put the juveniles at the service of adult criminals. (Those who take them in expect sexual favors, start them on the road to prostitution, etc.)

It is obvious that the positive effect of society begins with the passage of family rights laws, possibly taking children from drunken parents, with the community-forming role of youth organizations, culture houses and clubs. Children who are "time millionaires" easily become vagrants. (It is a fact which says much that in the past 7 years legal action has been taken only once in the capital against a juvenile actively engaged in sports, and that for neglect!) Not only the authors of domestic criminal psychology studies but practice also (for example in the GDR) points out that greater social material efforts are needed to satisfy the demand for movement, for something to fill the time, for adventure; and sports can do this most easily.

Together with social and state organs the responsible police organs are doing great work in the area of prevention. In addition to analytical work and prognostic research they are mapping, with the aid of social activists, the dangerous situations because most of these causes can be reduced. During the last school year workers of the Juvenile and Child Care Department of the Budapest Municipal Police Headquarters made direct personal contact with about 40,000 adolescents during home-room hours. (However, the effectiveness of these efforts is endangered by those teachers who regard the lectures as only a free period and do not use what is heard there, applying it to their students again and again.) Each year the Youth Policy Committee of the Capital Council discusses the situation of juveniles; representatives of the women's committees, the People's Front, the KISZ, the Ministry of Education and the police participate in this work. The decisions are not binding but they regard their execution as a responsibility.

Forecast

Surveys of various criminogenic factors and an analysis of the effect of tourist travel are available for making a scientific forecast. Tourism also creates opportunities for crime (foreign exchange cases, prostitution, incitement to steal art treasures, etc.) and can bring in fashions which are not too well received (hippy phenomena). The wave of narcotics is slowly approaching our borders and law enforcement authorities have begun preventive propaganda work and are taking administrative measures now before they have to struggle with the harmful consequences.

Can one forecast the development of crime and its effect on juveniles? The answer is an unambiguous yes. To protect the adolescents the police organs inform the enterprises of parents who drink or are rowdyish; this is a form of social prevention. An analysis of phenomena appearing in the West makes possible the preventive elimination of certain factors. The behavior of law enforcement organs and courts certainly serve the cause of prevention. Paragraph 87 of the Criminal Code calls on the courts to use educational measures first. Since a sentence only interrupts crime it is not a matter of indifference that the educational function should be exercised in the institution or under the hand of a probation officer after conditional release. ("Criminal pedagogy... is a branch of pedagogy the peculiarities of which are defined by... its adjustment to the requirements of punishment." --Andras Szabo: "A nevelesi helyzet alapproblemai a fiatakoruak bortoneben" [Basic Problems of the Educational Situation in Juvenile Prisons].) The KISZ has a serious task in this area.

Socialist social relationships do not automatically eliminate crime, do not put an end to latent aggressive instincts, do not eliminate situations which give rise to antisocial behavior; but the uniting of social forces and efforts and planned study of prevention can reassuringly reduce criminal behavior.

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HUNGARY

ACZEL COMMENTS ON ROLE OF LITERATURE IN CHANGING SOCIALIST SOCIETY

Budapest UJ IRAS in Hungarian No 10, Oct 76 pp 3-11

[Article by Deputy Premier Gyorgy Aczel, based on the text in the minutes of a speech given at the 17-18 May 1976 assembly of the Hungarian Writers Federation: "Creative Dissatisfaction"]

[Text] It is obvious to every person who is aware of history that not only is there no alternative to detente and peace but if there is, it is destruction and death. Similarly for the people who have won power there is no alternative but socialism.

We live in a rather difficult period of this new society in which there are no beaten paths; we have to discover them and make them passable. We must find a new answer to why it is worthwhile to live and this certainly is sometimes more difficult than to say why it is worthwhile to die. A very careful formulation and well-thought-out agreement is needed for us to see with whom and with what one can agree, what has changed in this country in the past 20 years, and then everything becomes clear.

It is a new situation in Hungarian history that now many of our problems need not be raised by literature and one need not fight to solve them alone. This change does not curtail the role and significance of literature but rather much more increases it, for we cannot do without its alliance.

In the difficult ages of our past there were many questions which only literature could bring up and we can all be happy that today it does not have such a lonely mission because power is not alienated from the people but rather a power welded with one people carries the responsibility for the common problems and difficulties.

Today the writer need not speak up for the fate of the foundling as Moricz did in his "Little Orphans;" the writer need not fight for electricity in the villages and the children need not be afraid of winter.

But we do have new problems of public life for which the solution must be formulated in the language of literature, profoundly and in many ways disclosing the human consequences of social processes.

Today the creative artists need not speak out to get the children of workers and peasants into our schools and universities, but this does not mean that they do not have urgent tasks in researching those new human dramas which derive from the fact that they did get there and beyond, tasks in dealing with the unavoidable conflicts of improvement.

Our literature does not have to speak up against the worker-peasant power for a shorter working day and more free time; but art does have a great role which nothing else can play in the struggle to give free time true freedom, meaning and content enriching man.

Our living literature, socialist Hungarian literature, embraces many generations: those writers behind whom there are long careers and great works and the young, too. As for the latter, they do not need pats on the back but rather trust and severe judgments and help so they will not so often run out of breath on their second volume, but maybe even more we should take care that we do not wear them out in those pseudo-debates which in this regard also are so anachronistic.

Literature, our literature with its great past, can fulfill its mission only if we do not cause one another superfluous trouble and care. We should not waste our energy on meaningless fights and pseudo-debates. Hatreds feeding on petty antipathies and personal affronts are unworthy not only of writers but of all men and frequently hold us back in healing the historical wounds of the people with as little error and delay as possible. This is our job, this is what we must pay attention to, and in this we must unite. We promise no idyll but we must raise men out of unnecessary grinding cares.

A man can learn much reading through the minutes of the meetings of the Writers' Federation over the past 25 years. The change can truly be measured in the purifying atmosphere of the debate which has taken place in this hall. Today there is no false unity as there was in 1951 but rather lively debate questions which agitate all of us. It is true that we have not yet learned to debate with complete honesty in a truly socialist manner. In a socialist manner--which means seeking the truth and not our own felt truth. Seeking truth even in the arguments of those debating with us because only in this way do the polemics have any sense.

I do not believe there are any among us who have not made errors in the past decades. We have no reason to deny this but neither would it be honest to forget it. I do not very much like this art form since I have had no occasion for it before but let me try a very brief confession. I

did not have any way to make a mistake at the congress of the Writers' Federation in 1951. If I had been there I would have certainly made a mistake. I consider it necessary to say this even if it did not happen. Because it is a shameful weakness if a person acts as if he had always seen the world perfectly. I have never hesitated to confess that I had no way to make a mistake; I had no opportunity to cheer Rakosi in the difficult times, for I would have done so because I believed in him. It would not be proper for me to deny today my faith of that time but neither would it be proper for me to stick stubbornly to a justly overthrown idol. I think that for a man to oppose himself, if difficult, is bearable and unavoidable. But to deny the error, to act as if we had always been infallible, this is unworthy of us all and gnaws at the credibility of our words of today. If we consistently think through and carry out this simple principle our debates, too, will change and we will free ourselves of emotions which shadow reason.

Doubtless there are justified and well-founded emotions which incline toward truth, but this good type of passion is not born from feelings of personal affront. Emotion feeding on affronts destroys our vision and our hearing and blunts our judgment. We should not go so far, even in the sharpest debate, that everything which those arguing with us does or writes or says becomes repulsive. A scene from "Anna Karenina" comes to mind at such times. Tolstoy writes that Anna was having coffee: "She raised the cup to her lips with her little finger extended. As she drank a few sips she looked at Vronskiy and saw clearly from his expression that her hand, her movement, the very sound she made with her lips were repulsive to him." Because everything she did was repulsive.

This scene immediately precedes Anna's suicide. Sometimes I think that it is an inhuman estrangement which should not happen because then our debates become unproductive; because principles disappear where personal emotions and mutual antipathies radiate from every statement.

Let us at least--our common cause demands it of us--not always seek that which drives us from one another. It is with difficulty that this people and this literature bear this sort of bad debate when they very much desire honest debates in which we do not want to overcome one another but rather want to go beyond our own limits in the interest of approaching a fuller, more complex truth.

We must direct our attention to the problems of the large community, problems which derive in large measure from the achievements and positive changes recognized by all of us. The greatest achievement is the elevation of the workers and peasants, the uniting of the workers, peasants and intellectuals, which means that the workers and peasants and intellectuals are now one family. This is literally true, for if I count brothers then 70 percent of the Hungarian families today are mixed families.

Friendships, loves and marriages no longer run into class restrictions, but relationships starting from different social sources or the meeting of divergent careers, the meeting of different ways of thinking and life styles, contain a great many conflicts. Where is this expressed artistically, and if it is has our literature expressed every pain and anguish of this transformation with sufficient force? Where has it been shown how difficult this elevation is, how much pain accompanies this transformation of others and ourselves, the development in these contacts?

There was a time when a favorite theme of the trash authors (and this was a tool for the illusory suppression of class oppositions) was the idyll of love binding members of opposed classes. He who takes up today the meeting of those arriving from different directions or the dramas of such meetings, let him cast light on real and typical social processes.

I am not talking just of today but of long-range problems when I speak of those 1,700,000 families which have household or supplementary farms in Hungary today. I am not talking just about economic problems when I speak of this and I don't want to return to the production literature of the 1950's either. We do not expect from literature illustrations of our general principles or our programs; we expect rather the disclosure of the living problems of working and creating people. One big human problem of socialism is the problem of old people, people who got used to working throughout a busy life; today a life of retirement is made bearable for many of them only by work around the house. Their household plots and little gardens have this role for them, too, over and above the great need for them in terms of supply. But who has written, for example, the tragedy of the president of the producer cooperative in Boly who died 2½ months after he retired (he was a National Assembly representative and received a good pension). He said to me in a hospital in Pecs, "You know, I had nothing to get up for!" This problem never existed before in society! All this could appear as a task for writers, to make people aware that we should deal honorably with old people, give old people something to look forward to so that they can live creatively. And we want to give and can give a place and a feeling of security to young people. I do not consider it chance that everywhere where we make it possible for someone to do intellectual work up to the age of 70 they make use of this opportunity with the greatest joy.

To make the contemporary problems of socialism understood we must again and again cast light on the past.

Many sorts of problems arise in connection with our past too. I completely agree with the prose poem of Ferenc Juhasz: Everyone must choose! Literature is truly "decision, undertaking, answer and judgment." We cannot undertake at the same time to be Dozsa and Werbczy! Either Dozsa or Werbczy! "There is no parley here! Here there can be no

forgetting, no excuse." Both are history but no one should misinterpret Attila Jozsef, not by right of being a contemporary, because he mentioned Dozsa and Werboczy as health and sickness, and not as two things which should be loved equally. The first secretary of our party was right when he said that "two types of tradition stand sharply opposed in Hungarian history, that of the revolution and that of the counterrevolution." So we must guard against all that frequently reassuring amnesia which would forget this opposition. Without an evaluation of our traditions from the class viewpoint there is no national self-awareness nor is there any socialist patriotism.

It is worthwhile to think on what sort of phenomenon of life, on what sort of anachronistic pride result in the double names proliferated among us. I am not thinking now of the differentiating names or nicknames but of the aristocratic names, the names spelled with a "y".

Of course it is never enough to pay attention to partial phenomena in politics or in art. One must struggle against partial truths combining into false conceptions. The writers must not fight in one way and the power in another, they must fight together. Because writers also are threatened by the danger, as Janos Arany noted, of raising false charges against our society on the basis of phenomena which "are true in part." This does not threaten the power but it does threaten the artistic truth of their creations.

One of our recognized big problems is insufficient housing. But new dwellings are being built by the tens of thousands and we should remember that the houses being handed over, the modern homes, not only solve problems but cause new ones. This is because the people moving out of the houses to be rehabilitated must break with a way of life which, however miserable their old homes were, had often grown to their hearts. They will mourn the shrub which they painfully nurtured in the tiny courtyard, that intimacy which the little one-story house meant for them; it will be difficult for them to get used to the elevator and the nickel tap. And this is not even to speak of how when someone moves into a new dwelling he needs not only furniture but pictures for the wall and books to humanize what we now call home.

We can be proud that this is now a mass demand and we do not do well if in some heated debate we shrill that the people are in danger because they like Jokai. Let me say, without being a fan of Jokai, that I hope that in that new city of 4,000 dwellings which is now being built in Leninvaros, where there are no books in half the dwellings, that there will be Jokai and even Gardonyi just so that people start to read.

Lunacharskiy was right when he spoke with strong criticism of those who awaited a cultural October and "imagined that in some beautiful hour of

some beautiful month of some beautiful year they would seize the Academy of Sciences or the Grand Theater along with the Winter Palace." It is indispensable that we apply the principle of patience in this area of life also and the battle here, too, can only be a two-front struggle. We have gotten to the point Lunacharskiy described where we bow down before the ABC book and say it was a pity that Marx wrote "Capital" because it is too difficult to read.

With socialism culture became a necessity for the first time in history, for the first time there was a society which as a customer differed from every previous patron of the arts on a world-historical scale. To order or to commission is not an external command but rather coincides with the internal command of art in all ages, with its most unique aspirations.

The building of a developed socialism demands from us improved work in every area and this is an increasingly complex task. I read in a speech by an American psychologist named Cambell that a measure was passed in the United States according to which officials were rewarded for cases completed. The result was that they did not take care of complicated cases but only simple ones. We cannot work in this fashion. We must prepare our people and ourselves to see that everything which is accomplished can cause contradictions, that there never was and will not be an idyll, that new problems arise after every problem is solved. We must understand and we must make everyone understand that the achievements of socialism are not realized automatically; that only conscious, constantly renewed efforts can ensure their more extensive and their more intensive realization. All of us have a great responsibility in common in making this understood.

In our literary policy the same principles have guided us and do guide us as permeate our entire politics.

We know that our goals define the possible tools and if Marxist principles are not realized in our methods then we will not be able to realize our aspirations. We have not bought or sold heads, we have not purchased backbones, but we have debated honorably and openly with everyone, if necessary we have fought, if possible we were friendly. We promised offices to no one so that they would be with us and we have not sacrificed a single person to be popular with others.

This is hardly any more important than the fact that politics no longer has a say in whether the poet uses iambs or trochaics.

We want to achieve unity not in questions of style but in questions of worldview. Nor do we want to "relieve" anyone of social obligations, of assuming our joint tasks, because this would be only the "freedom" of

negation and this would only isolate literature from society, from the people, from the cause of socialism. We consider worthy of a man only the freedom of bonds consciously assumed, a freedom filled with responsibility, and this does not pertain only to authors. Just as respect for talent is one of our principles which we must implement in every area of work because there is no equality where greater accomplishment cannot rise, where talent and knowledge and assuming burdens are not recognized.

We can make the path of development more free only if we nail no one for his past mistakes but do expect that our writer friends not bind themselves to false ideals which have been bypassed by history. "Divide and conquer" is not our principle and cannot be our principle; on the contrary, we must take action against artificial restrictions which separate those who have a place on the common team.

We practice patience and we make a pledge to those who err but we cannot dispense with a criticism which names names nor with passionate debate in necessary cases. We know that the creator is a discoverer, that there are no roads with signs in place so it may be that long and difficult detours may be taken before a significant work is created. And mistakes may be made in the meantime. It is also obvious that not all mistakes are of equal rank. Some may be subjective, possibly slips. We know that even such giants of literature as Tolstoy were not free of faulty views but even so Tolstoy was a faithful mirror of the Russian revolution.

Nor should anyone expect that we will remain silent about incorrect views, about false mirror images, just as we do not expect uncritical praise of our achievements by literature. The closer we come to one another the more natural it will be that we debate with one another. We must get used to this idea.

I say that since the same Marxist worldview is dominant among us we can permit debate, even sharp debate, if we presume in one another honest and constructive intentions. I want first to understand that the partner understands because only on this basis can I disagree with him. But for this we must clarify the real questions being debated.

It is such debate, if anything, which I find missing and I believe that this sort of debate must be put in the foreground, not in the forming of groups but rather in open, common forums. What is most important is that we know how to debate, that we know one another, that our fundamental agreement, which has been forged over a long time, during one and a half decades, provide a foundation for straight talk.

We must also speak about the situation and tasks of our criticism. Our literary policy has great need for good criticism because if we give room, and we have given room, for different trends, if we guarantee publication

of all humanist values in literature, then we must offer, not in contradiction to this, a solid value orientation with the aid of criticism. I do not believe that we would solve our problems if we were to say that the critics should love the authors and then the situation would improve and there would be peace. I rather take the position that the critic should love what he must, and should reject what he must, but before all else on the basis of progress, on the basis of progressive artistic principles.

The example of Aladar Toth is instructive; he did not want to approve the publication of a collection of his criticisms because, as he said, "I was unjust to Richard Strauss." But why was he unjust? "Because when I could fight for Bartok only by not examining Strauss I was unjust to Strauss in the fight for Bartok." Such things happen but this is an honorable "injustice" free of clique views and this is what is most important.

The more our criticism uses a Marxist approach and the more consistently it uses such an approach and the more it debates with works from within the broader it may open the gates for more and more to come to agreement. But honest, principled criticism cannot recognize big names and little names; a well-founded position can be taken only on the basis of a comparison of the work with reality. So criticism should not stick to the judgments and prejudices of yesterday, to the already formed status or rank of some writer. We do not expect from criticism that it uncritically love literature and we do not expect that the writers will uncritically love criticism but it is a just demand that there should be efforts from both sides for understanding.

Many modern trends are appearing now in criticism and I am trying to be careful lest I be a conservative. But when a few people, perhaps because they do not know the past, believe that they are being awfully modern by calculating the ratio of vowels and consonants and trying to classify the various periods in the poetry of Attila Jozsef on the basis of how many back vowels and how many front vowels he used in various periods I think of the academicism of the end of the last century with its highly formalist analysis which tried to do the same thing for different poets then.

We do not reject any modern method but we stick to this that there is no place in medical science for one who does not look on man as an organism and there is no place in criticism or literary science for one who does not look at the work.

Another problem with our literary life is that there is no normally operating system of selection. Even Babits complained in his day, I think in the foreword he wrote in 1938 for an anthology of poetry for the Janos Vajda Society: "How many are those who write poetry and how few are the poets." Still there must be some selection; hundreds and hundreds start out but they should not stick to it if their talents do not make them suitable for

it. Mediocrity is destructive in literature. As the students say, "A sure B." I sometimes long to read something truly bad, something that really betrays weak talent, and not the sure B's.

When one gets at the first of the month the thousand-page literary monthlies, KORTARS, UJ IRAS and the provincial journals, anguish seizes him: To go through so much text! There are no peaks, literature hardly has any good sensations; no really good poem, outstanding story or surprising, good criticism stands out. Western bourgeois papers sometimes write that there are masses of unpublished works here in the desks. Where are they? The leaders of the publishing houses are here today. Look for them, find them; in vain. I cannot give a ready solution to this problem, the debate has given no help, but I do know that a healthily functioning good literary life could help a great deal.

A young writer said to me reproachfully that Pal Szabo got the price of many cows for his first book. I did not try to cipher it out, maybe that is true. But one thing is sure, that not one writer of the older generation did not learn that one must work bitterly for everything. Capitalism taught them that. It taught Gyula Illyes who worked in the National Bank; it taught Geza Feja; and it taught Istvan Vas at the Standard or in the canning factory. I know a 26-year-old man who says today that his creative spirit is incompatible with his taking work anywhere. I ask literary public opinion to help him make it compatible. Let us look at those older writers who, it affects me to say it, did not grudge the effort to come here or who greeted the meeting by letter. Why? Because even if they are sick they are driven by a feeling of responsibility which must become the social public morality in socialism.

So let us talk about the debates. I fully subscribe to what Tibor Dery wrote in his letter, that association is good if it does not get transformed into cliques. Cliques will kill the differentiation of schools and styles because we cannot debate with one another in cliques.

Who does not know what sharp oppositions there were in NYUGAT, what debates, what flaming battles! But it was for this very reason that NYUGAT was able to create a truly creative atmosphere. This cannot develop where the rule is: "Genius dwells in you; in you, sir, not in others."

It has frequently been said, and I believe it, that there are pseudo-debates in the populist-urbanist question. There are those who say: "I will say who is a populist and I will decide who is an urbanist." Yes indeed, but we can learn from our history at the price of bitter experiences that even false awareness can be a destructive force and it is not enough to speak against it, one must act against it, too. Let me recall just one example, the acts of the Historical Monuments Committee in the early 1940's,

the practice of the common struggle waged then was decisive in the debate as to who was a true patriot, where the real boundary was between progress and reaction.

For socialism and for a better life for the people of socialism we have allied ourselves with our Catholic poet and writer friends also; we have allied ourselves with our friends with other worldviews, too, but we should never lose sight of our goals. For us Marxism is not one trend among others, it is the truth of our age with the aid of which one can grasp the essence of historical processes, express the requirements for progress and fight for their realization.

Many bring up the earlier clashes, for example in 1958, the debate about the populist writers, and even remember that the debate was in good taste. But we should not forget that our position then was not only debate but recognition of the merits of the populist movement. This was born in struggle for there were those who did not want an alliance even with those continuing the leftist tradition of the populists. Despite this the debate document was published and it became decisive.

So there is no need to collect grievances or conserve hatreds if we are to better see and survey more impartially our path. We can draw this lesson from experience, too, that we can approach one another if we are able to doubt the uniquely correct nature of our thoughts and judgments of yesterday.

Our holidays have come up, guarding the values of our past. It is not easy to find a way of celebration worthy of socialism and certainly a purer order of values must be realized in this area, too. I know an example of this, the poster in Szigetvar which said: "Celebrate the 400th Anniversary of the Capitulation of Szigetvar." I think we do not need to celebrate defeats. Not even in connection with Szigetvar. We do not need to celebrate death, but life. We should remember the heroic dead. We must see the meaning of their struggle and death but let us celebrate historic victories, creative work, and life.

When I speak of a critical mastering of the past and a defense of its values I am not thinking only of the distant past. We have, for example, such a value of Marxist Hungarian esthetics as the spiritual tradition of Gyorgy Lukacs. I am thinking of what he himself asked of us. He said to wait if you wanted to debate with him. And we debated with Lukacs.

With the respect due the great creator, I might say with homage. If he were alive, if he were among us, I would not say that I could do it after his death. We can and must debate with some of his views still but we

cannot do without the values of his life's work, we must use them for Hungary and socialism. The life's work of Lukacs bides its time but we do not have time to bide our time until his ideas are realized.

Similarly Attila Jozsef did not need us to celebrate the 70th anniversary of his birth but we had need of it. We also need that intellectual legacy which Gyorgy Balint represents. One of the great strengths of socialism is that it integrates values and makes them a public treasure. Our world-view, as Lenin says, did not come into being far from the highways of civilization; we are the rightful inheritors of all progressive thought.

It is not easy to banish prejudices from an evaluation of the past.

Gyula Illyes touched on one aspect of the national question. "One of the greatest dangers to European intellectual life," he wrote in lines greeting the assembly of the Writers' Federation, "one of the most violent problems of intellectual life is the still spreading destructive differentiation and discrimination among peoples and the humiliating, reason-impoverishing disadvantages of discrimination according to mother tongue and origin." And he adds that the problem is complex so the knife operating in this sensitive area must be handled with hair-line precision.

I think that we all know that we have great responsibility when we make statements about these questions. And we also know that our internationalist truth must and will win.

What is this truth? Attila Jozsef, our greatest socialist poet, expressed it this way: "Turkish, Tatar, Slovak and Romanian blood flow through this heart." We have proudly referred to this at home and abroad.

We can count only on the strength of socialism as a possible solution to the nationalities question.

When we do everything to strictly honor the rights of nationalities living with us so that they will find a home here we are not doing this only for them but also in the interest of the Hungarians. Only an internationalist policy can ensure a future, a secure future for our nation and every nation.

In this spirit we have recently commemorated those Hungarian and Romanian internationalists, communist and non-communist patriots who created KORUNK in the most difficult times. We are proud that this was a common holiday of two peoples; the entire history of KORUNK proves that the realization of internationalism is the only realistic alternative; this is what is prescribed by our principles, by the goals before us and by the prospects for the development of our socialist nation. This is why we regard KORUNK

jubilee as a common cause because we respect progressive traditions in our own homeland just as we do in fraternal socialist countries.

Returning to the problems of internal development I would like to speak about several questions of a further development of socialist democracy. We must disperse many false beliefs in connection with democracy. Everyone must understand that the realization and practice of democracy is not an easy thing. It cannot be ordered and introduced but must be studied and the lesson is hard.

Among the difficult things which democracy demands of us one of the most difficult is that we tolerate with respect unpleasant truths from one another, that we debate questions which did not have to be discussed before, that we work under the supervision of publicity, for publicity means a firm control which is not easy to cheat.

There were certain well-known "advantages" to the personality cult. For example, that it was not necessary to think. Certainly we must give up these advantages; indeed, those who got used to not thinking must be led to the path of independent thinking relentlessly but with the strength of democracy. Only the realization of democracy can force back petit-bourgeois thinking and isolation.

Bringing our conflicts to the surface and solving them is possible only on this road. I am thinking of real and not artificial conflicts. We can note with pleasure, for example, that the theme of conflict between writer and power which came into the foreground in debates and works 10 years ago, and which gave birth to many good works, is today a thing of the past.

Today the writers see the party and state officials differently, as can be seen from what has been said here. The difference between us is that a writer cannot be appointed but the official must be elected and appointed and for a definite time. We do not give writers their office nor can we take it away but each must win it or lose it for himself.

This mutuality will be stronger as we learn common thinking, thinking and acting for common problems. Not only at such times of celebration but also tomorrow and the day after tomorrow.

We made an oath which was first voiced on 11 November 1956 at a meeting of our Central Committee, then a body with 23 members. I would like to recall it. Comrade Janos Kadar said: "We will do everything to build a socialist Hungary without superfluous blood, tears and sweat." We must be faithful to this, supervising each other, and strictly supervising each other. We will cause each other difficult minutes and hours but we will hold to what we have accepted.

I believe what has been often formulated better and more competently than I can formulate it, that history now poses for the first time, in the last quarter-century of the millenium, in our homeland and for all mankind, the question "Why do we live?" If we are to answer this question convincingly and authentically we must see how we live and how we could live differently, more rationally, growing up to our possibilities. We have no ready-made schema for this answer. Hundreds of thousands of working people are forming the new content of life in our weekdays because transforming their world they change themselves and the world of all of us. New needs and new capabilities are being born, in work before all else, and we can answer only if we know this everyday struggle and the new values being born there.

We are bound together by a creative dissatisfaction which inspires work. This is needed because I am convinced that there are no finally overcome dangers and problems. The years awaiting us are not easy. Behind the modest rise in the standard of living there will be a transitional stagnation in the standard of living for some strata; there will be new difficulties for not a few families appearing with the increasing well-being and the increasing population growth. And we, even in these circumstances, want to prove that we are capable of changing our ideals increasingly into a practical reality. Great and flattering international attention is directed toward the work of this little people and we must stand firm to come up to the expectations.

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CONDITIONS FAVOR GREATER PLURALISM, PUBLIC POLITICAL ROLE

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[Article by Dr Sylwester Zawadzki, director of the Institute of Constitutional Law and Legal Theory at Warsaw University: "Issues of Socialist Democracy"]

[Text] "The more complicated goals we undertake demanding greater independence and initiative of the working classes, the more persistently we should strengthen and realize the practical implementation of socialist democracy" (from the program report of the Political Bureau, presented by the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, comrade Edward Gierek, at the Seventh Congress of the Polish United Workers Party).

The following assumptions should be considered the starting point in discussing the development of socialist democracy as a basic component of the process of forming a progressive socialist society:

--In a nationwide socialist country, which is the ultimate goal of every proletarian dictatorship, democracy retains its class character and continues to be a democracy of the working classes, thereby becoming a national democracy at the same time.

--The development of social democracy and self-government in a fully developed socialist society determines the objective trend toward progress.¹

--The Marxist-Leninist party, the driving force of the society,² is responsible for the development of socialist democracy.³ It is also clear that the practice of democracy within the party plays a special role in the actual development of nationwide socialist democracy. In addition to ensuring the possibility of a particularly active participation of the 2 and one-half million PZPR members in the life of the society, the main significance lies in the dissemination of democratic principles within the party.

--Under present conditions, the realization of socialist democracy should take increasingly greater account of the needs arising from scientific and technical progress that are related to the achievement of an increasingly higher level of production capacity and integrally connected with the system of goals and values of the socialist regime.

--Socialist democracy does not imitate liberal middle-class models, but is expressed by and develops along lines conforming to the class-oriented new socioeconomic form based on public ownership of production means. With the resulting uniformity of general principles and solutions, the forms of socialist democracy developing over a long-term period and in perpetual confrontation with experience may become differentiated and enriched, depending on the conditions and experience of individual countries.

The necessity of socialist democratic development has an objective character since it is associated with the very essence of a socialist country--a country where government by the working classes and respect for human rights is being achieved, where the supremacy of socialism over capitalism is made manifest. This objective character of the principles related to the development of socialist democracy stems also from the new potentials, needs and necessities that arise after the foundations of socialism have been built, during the formative stage of a fully developed socialist society. We have to deal with regulations; compliance with the latter yields positive results in all areas, whereas violation inevitably brings on negative results.

The potentials and needs of further socialist democratic development, which we are experiencing now, are associated with socialist changes and the country's economic development, as well as with fundamental changes in the class structure of the society. These are reflected in the liquidation of classes thriving on exploitation (landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie), in the qualitative changes within the working class and in the preservation of its leading role, in the strengthening of the alliance between workers and peasants (e.g., by close cooperation between small producers and planned socialist management), and in the rapid development of socialist intelligentsia; two-thirds of the latter emerged from the ranks of the working class and peasantry, and achieved 90 percent of their education and professional status in People's Poland. This new social situation is conducive to the development of socialist democracy even if the processes of awareness take place at a slower rate than large-scale structural changes.

The changes relating to the people's education are of primary significance, and are very briefly summarized in the following table:

Education, in thousands	1938	1945	1955	1960	1970	1974
University	70-80	35-40	261	415	655	804
High school	200-220	100-120	1300	1800	2700	4000

Thus, over the past 30 years, the number of citizens with a university education has increased by 20 and the number of high school graduates has increased by nearly 40. Not only is it important that now 3.9 percent of the people in their productive years have a university education and 19.3 percent possess a high school education, but also that there is a significant decrease in the number of adults with incomplete elementary education and no formal schooling (it dropped from 43.3 percent in 1960 to 12.6 percent in 1974). The rise in the level of education makes possible an increasingly wider, more conscious and competent civic participation in the management of national affairs on all levels and in nearly all areas of national activity.

Primary importance is given to the changes in the political consciousness of the society, in which the acceptance of socialist ideals is becoming more widespread and permanent. It is outwardly reflected in social activity and in the various manifestations of participation in the building of socialism. The establishment of socialist consciousness is one of the basic prerequisites for the further development of democracy which is, in itself, an indispensable mainspring and plane of conscious processes. It permits the people "to learn about socialism: on an increasingly wider scale from their own experience, from their social life, and not only from books or schoolwork.

Let us also point out the changes that have occurred, within the class system on an international scale--the changes which made possible the transition from the "cold war" to significant progress in peaceful coexistence. We cannot include a more thorough analysis of this problem at the present time, but it can only be said that the new situation, characterized by a tendency toward detente in international relations, is creating extremely more favorable conditions for the development of socialist democracy than the "cold war" period.

Thus, conditions today are much more favorable for the development of democracy than they were in the past stage of building socialist principles. The exploitation of these potentially better opportunities should be planned and cannot be a matter of voluntary decisions. The development of a political and legal superstructure should not lag behind socioeconomic development. Along with potential possibilities and favorable conditions there are objective needs for the further development of socialist democracy. These needs are, first and foremost, of an economic nature, related to a domination of socialist ownership as the basis of the socioeconomic and political

structure. They are related to a range of goals set for the socioeconomic development program a program that cannot be realized without the improvement of conditions for social initiative in joint management and joint responsibility. For example, Kazimierz Secomski mentions the structural element as being a major factor in economic development, which he defines as "...sociopolitical relations, the possibility for a truly comprehensive activation of the widest social strata and the organization of public effort toward the radical acceleration of the rate of economic growth and structural changes."⁴ All the experience relating to actually existing socialism gained up to the present time indicates that, within the framework of fixed universal goals, conformity with basic regulations and structural norms, the guidance of society should be different today than it was yesterday, and different tomorrow than it is today. The development of socialist democracy forms an integral element in the continuous adaptation of governmental practices to changing conditions.

The need to mold structural forms which would stimulate the activity of the widest social strata is obviously apparent from the very beginning of socialist economic operation. Furthermore, this need was not always perceived and taken into consideration.⁵ Today it is more widely pronounced, and the scope of the problem will become even greater as the development of a socialist society progresses. It results at least from the increasing role of individuals and groups in the production process, from the necessity for the fullest possible exploitation of qualifications and experience, and the stimulation of innovative creativity.⁶ In our country it is also closely related to the demographic situation and the decrease in new labor resources, which will enhance the value of truly good work for everyone in their respective jobs.

The actuation of social efforts and the creation of conditions for an ever wider activation of social energy depend on the improvement of structural forms, which stimulate creative human activity. Socialist democracy must be developed to this end and improved according to actual needs and possibilities; it must be looked on not as a fixed situation but as a continuous, upward process. Ensuring a realistic influence of citizens on social issues, an influence which they, in fact, feel to be undeniable, affects the formation of the basis of joint management in a place of work, the community and the city, the voivodship and the country. The participation made possible by the effective, nonformalized functioning of institutes and bodies which make up the socialist democratic structure, fosters and strengthens the sense of joint responsibility and promotes the development of initiative and discipline which are indispensable for the fulfillment of socioeconomic goals.

It is expected that, under the conditions of a fully developed socialist society, an even greater feedback will occur, characterized not only by the effect of economic development on the emergence of new premises for socialist democratic development but by the increasing influence of

socialist democracy on the economic growth rate. The lack of full understanding of the connection between the strategy of socioeconomic development and the development of socialist democracy and self-government may become increasingly detrimental in building a fully developed socialist society and in increasing the economic, social and cultural premises of objective needs for the development of socialist democracy. This also stems from the practical problems which can only be resolved through the realization of the program outlined at the Seventh PZPR Congress.

In Western literature we can see a widely represented trend questioning the possibility of democratic development, trying to show its inadequacy towards a tendency which generates a scientific and technical revolution in capitalism as well as socialism. Irrespective of the opinions expressed by individual representatives of this trend (e.g., Shelsky with his conception of a "technical nation", Galbraith and his concept of "technically structured governments" or Gabor and his notion of "expertocracy" as visions of governments which would satisfy the needs of a scientific and technical revolution), these representatives share the common belief that, with the advancement of technical progress and the increased role of experts, there will be an inevitable development of the process whereby power is concentrated in the hands of an increasingly smaller ruling elite. Consequently, the increasing role of experts would reduce the possibilities for wide working classes to affect a country's government and, therefore, make it impossible to realize a democracy. The words of E. Forsthoff are, in a certain sense, typical of this trend: "All the problems of economic life have become professional problems that can only be resolved by experts and very often only with the aid of the latest technological means, such as computers." And, consequently, in a highly industrialized modern society, "...the average citizen regards himself more and more ignorant of the country's social affairs and unable to understand government administration; this is why he leaves such matters to the experts."⁷

The purpose of this article is neither a general criticism of these concepts, which try to revive outdated and passe notions of "administrative omniscience," nor an analysis of their detailed variants which allegedly justify the inevitable crisis faced by such democratic institutions as parliament, local self-government and forms of direct democracy. It is also obvious that a separate article would be necessary to explain the standpoint of Marxist theory with regard to the role of technical progress in social development. However, in view of the subject discussed here, it is necessary to take a stand on two points. First--is it true that all the crucial problems of economic and social life are professional problems which can only be resolved by experts? Second--if this is the case, does the increasing role of professionals necessarily signify the inevitable limitation of working class influence and the degradation of democratic institutions?

The theory of the increasing importance of professional know-how and, consequently, of professionals in government activity and in the entire system

of social management is well-founded. The actual progress of the scientific and technical revolution confirms its validity. Nowadays it is impossible to do without expertise (even with the possibility of submitting several variants of estimates and solutions) and without a scientifically-based information system. There is no way to optimize decisions or rectify them on the basis of experience without the wide participation of the professional element.⁸ But this is only one aspect of the problem; the statement that technical and economic problems are purely professional in nature and can only be resolved by the experts themselves does not take into account the fact that these problems always have their political and social sides which cannot, by any means, be overlooked in the decision-making process. Aside from the criteria of professional know-how in the decision-making process, it is necessary to consider the ideological, political and social criteria, which calls for agreement between the proposed solutions and the accepted system of values. What matters in a socialist society are the immanent values for this system, in accordance with its political nature and far-reaching goals, the prevision of social consequences of decision-making and social approval of these decisions. Expert know-how alone is wholly inadequate for this purpose; familiarization with social needs is equally essential, as is the ability to correctly establish their priorities, selection and assessment according to set social goals. The principle of promoting a more extensive use of professional opinions in the decision-making process does not mean that the professional point of view is the only one, or that it is enough.

I share the view that: "It is not possible, in any state system, to let very specialized experts have a decisive influence in state matters. This would mean dividing the activities of the state system into very narrow streams, often diverging or intercrossing, which not only would not guarantee the desired result but would even often produce a harmful result from every point of view, even if the best techniques of each specialization were used. The individual cogs of the state machine, although amply oiled with professional know-how, would either turn in a social vacuum or be in each other's way."⁹

The complexity of modern development problems does not reduce but rather increases the need for a comprehensive formulation of decisions, taking into account the ideological and political, social and psychological factors in addition to professional criteria. Furthermore, this need is being felt more as the division of labor and specialization in administrative activity deepens. Just as the process of specialization in a scientific field generates an ever-increasing need for its integration, so the process of specialization in state activities increases the importance of political and social factors in the decision-making process.¹⁰

The optimization of the state decision-making process necessitates the formation of a socialist state (including the structure of its organs) and the course of development of the entire superstructure which would ensure the increased role of not only the political and social factor, but the professional factor and the proper coordination of these factors. At

the same time, it also calls for a more precise differentiation between the sociopolitical and technical, organizational aspects, the creation of conditions for the maximum possible manifestation of these aspects and their confrontation in discussions on various possible solutions. Only in this way is it possible to improve administration and increase the effectiveness of its activity through the increased participation of working classes in the administration and development of socialist democracy.

The experience gained in the building of socialism in Poland--and I believe this experience is shared by other socialist nations--shows that these two goals cannot be interchangeable and, even more importantly (as has sometimes been the case), cannot be set against each other. It would be most illogical and unrealistic to underestimate the effect of a genuine improvement in administration on the development of socialist democracy. However, it is also unacceptable to underestimate the basic effect of democracy on the quality of the decision-making process and on the effectiveness of administrative activity, as well as the conformity of this effect with the social goals of socialism.¹¹

There is no doubt that the principle of a simultaneous development of socialist democracy and improvement of administrative activity, which was expressed in the resolutions of the Sixth and Seventh PZPR Congresses, is associated with the basic trend in the development of a political superstructure in a fully developed socialist society--a trend which must become deeply rooted in all aspects of social life.

On the basis of past experience we can assume that indirect forms of democracy will also prevail in a developed socialist society. Hence the particular importance of activities aimed at raising the standard and improving the model for all forms of socialist public representation. This ties in with the constitutionally accepted modern principle of consultation. Since these are based on evoking direct public opinion which, in practice, is not possible except in the form of a nationwide referendum, they therefore rely on seeking out the opinions of the widest possible public representation or interested parties. It is important that this representation is illustrative and is capable of expressing a wide range of opinion and presenting a full scope of thoroughly discussed, considered remarks and proposals. As stressed by Comrade Edward Gierek at a meeting attended by the first secretaries of party committees from major enterprises; "It is natural that, in the face of complex goals and problems, differences in opinion, opposing points of view, ideas and proposals may arise in a society. The crux of the matter is to have them derived always from honest intentions so that they find true expression in deepening social political culture..."

The socialist model of representation is based on the principle of hierarchy (i.e., the appointment of a representative body at every level of administrative activity), the superiority of elected representative bodies over

administrative bodies, and on the coordination of forms of representation with the forms of direct democracy. These principles were, in fact, proved on many occasions and fully deserve their continuation; the representation system will face new problems during the formation of a fully developed socialist society because we are gradually leaving behind an era in which society was dominated by antagonistic conflicts. In addition to strengthening moral and political national unity, social conflicts will, above all, be nonantagonistic in nature. This fundamental difference must be reflected in the functions of the representation system and in its course of action, in the discussion of problems and expression of opinions, which should be voiced within the framework of civil rights peculiar to our system, thoroughly examined and considered.

From this point of view it appears that the evolution of criteria by which representatives are elected and the further improvement of the electoral system warrant further discussion. The hitherto existing electoral system, formed under conditions of intense class struggle, is adapted to resolve antagonistic conflicts and ensures the socialist trend of activities by representative bodies. But the question arises: Not relinquishing--even a bit--the fundamental principle of ensuring the socialist course of development, should we--in a developed socialist society--seek out solutions that would enrich the existing electoral system with greater possibilities for expressing preferences with regard to candidates for local bodies as listed on election ballots? Recognizing elections as a means of expressing one's attitude toward an election program, we should strive to make them also a means of expressing one's attitude toward different candidates who represent this program. This could produce a substantial effect on the strengthening of unity between the public and its representatives, expand the criteria whereby candidates are recruited for representative bodies so that, alongside political, social, professional and educational qualifications, allowance would be made for such personal attributes as participation in social work, the ability to work well with others and receptiveness to their problems, moral courage to defend rightful issues, individual initiative and persistence in striving toward one's goal.

Raising the standards of representative bodies depends largely on the further improvement of the control and decision-making functions of the Sejm and the people's councils. One resolution of the Seventh Congress emphasized, among others, the absolute need for ensuring the feasibility and effectiveness of control by the Sejm which, for example, depends on the close relationship between a member of the Sejm and his constituency as well as on the steady inflow of voters' opinions to the areas of Sejm activity. Similarly, the key issue in people's councils is the raising of their status as governing bodies, the main sources of social self-government and as the means for exerting steady control over the administration.

The new definition of the nature of people's councils, as stated in a constitutional amendment, binds them to undertake activities in many directions. Apart from the increase of self-government factors in the

very workings of these councils and the strengthening of their ties with different forms of self-government, it is necessary to strengthen the financial basis of council activity and improve budgetary conditions for the development of self-government. This cannot be achieved by divesting the councils of the power to make use of budgetary excesses. The immediate effects achieved in this manner in a given economic situation should not obstruct longrange goals for increasing the economic initiative of a society and a more widespread joint management by society through the councils.

The structure of regional administrations and people's councils, their decisions, activities and interdependence are particularly clear-cut examples of complex problems concealed in the concept of democratic centralism. Any disturbance of the relation between the element of a homogenous, disciplined executive organ and the element of consultation, discussion and social control issuing from the ranks of the workers must inevitably lead to a weakening of the principle: The more discussion before making a decision, the more discipline in its realization. Also, from the same point of view, the further development of the representation system is, without doubt, one of the most important directions of intensifying socialist democracy along the lines of democratic centralism.

Emphasizing the basic significance of hierarchical socialist representation, we cannot fail to notice the need for its supplementation and enrichment with nonrepresentative forms of democracy, forms which create conditions for a direct influence of the citizen in public affairs. Our past achievement in this field is significant, as can be seen in the wide range and large-scale character of various forms of participation. It is a well-proven fact that quantitative achievement is not always accompanied by sufficient concern for the effectiveness and efficacy of these institutions' functions. We know from experience that manifestations of formalism or ostentation become a potential source of skepticism, views doubting the feasibility of the right to joint management and the usefulness of expressing opinions. There are still tendencies toward underestimating the potentialities of social self-government, a sort of "administrative paternalism" in the form of trends toward the subordination of social bodies to professional and administrative bodies. We are also faced with the inability to take advantage of the powers accorded the self-governing bodies, the repetition of meetings and conferences, the thwarting of decisions and the interception of powers, which create a waste of time and efforts.

Of the many problems relating to this issue, an important one is the diversity of forms of social self-government, in which a key role is played by workers' self-government. Planning and management reform along the lines of socioeconomic goals, which calls for an increase in the self-government of economic objects, ensured potential conditions for the development of independence of production enterprises. Sometimes, however, we are faced with interpreting the principle of one-man management in a

manner contradictory to the principle of staff participation in company management, or there are tendencies to emphasize one side at the risk of the other.¹² There are also indications of particularism on the part of departments, branches and economic organizations.

It seems that the leading idea in the reform of regional government should be a leading factor in economic planning and management. The present needs of our country dictate the necessity of simultaneously strengthening and improving company management (and economic management in general), intensifying the workers' democracy and increasing staff participation in management. The achievement of higher work quality and higher production efficiency calls for--as was emphasized at the Third Plenum of the KC PZPR--the intensification of democratic factors, the influence of the working class on company management and managerial leadership.

In connection with urban development and large-scale housing construction along the lines of an objective process reflecting the people's increased demands for social ties, interhuman relations and standards of living, which increases the influence of these factors on social feelings and attitudes, special attention must be given to the self-government of city dwellers. The 1973 enactment of self-government reform in this area created much better conditions for its development and for deeper socialist relations in residential areas. From the whole system of goals and foundations of a fully developed socialist society, it is evident that the problem of ensuring the effective activity of self-government by city dwellers will take on increasingly greater significance with time. This is linked to the awakening of social initiative and the elimination of bureaucratic and technocratic obstacles along the road to development. A fuller expansion of the political, economic and socioeducational functions of city dwellers' self-government would mean a major advancement in urban socialist democracy.

As a result of the reform on territorial division and the formation of communes, a significantly greater role is now played by rural self-government, which involves the appointment of a village administrator and the establishment of village meetings as well as committees and organizations working under the auspices of the FJN [National Unity Front]. It is very important, of course--and not only for the villages--to intensify the elements of self-government and public control in all cooperative organizations.

The overall picture of nonrepresentative forms of democracy also includes forms of civic participation in the dispensation of justice on a large scale, e.g., in the appointment of a people's assessor, bodies of citizens having jurisdiction over minor offenses, mediatory committees, public inspectors and public conciliatory committees.

Pointing out their importance, it should be emphasized nevertheless that they are not in a position to replace the forms of indirect democracy,

inasmuch as the representation system alone cannot ensure the advantages derived from nonrepresentative forms of democracy. But due to the existence of numerous "small forms" of joint government, there is the possibility of engaging a wide circle of citizens in national affairs, and thus a substantially larger group than would be possible solely within the framework of the representation system itself. The diversity and flexibility of these forms permits the participation of citizens with various, sometimes narrow and specialized, interests in national affairs, and makes it possible to widen the circle of social activists and develop their initiative.

Direct forms of civic participation make it possible to confront the opinions of the social element with the standpoint of the professional and administrative element on every level and in every area of administrative activity, thereby widening the front and increasing the effectiveness of the ever-important and necessary struggle with bureaucracy. These "small forms" of democracy relate, after all, to the areas closely connected with the solution of the most realistic and everyday problems faced by the citizens, and progress in these areas is beneficial to the strengthening of ties between the state system and the public.

The problems relating to civil rights and responsibilities warrant separate discussion. In this article I am only dealing with certain problems in this area, excluding such important issues as the problem mentioned at the beginning of this article, of active participation in national government through party membership and the effect of democracy within the party on democracy in general. Other key issues I have excluded here deal with strengthening of the government's position and raising the status of social organizations, as well as the question of creating conditions for the further strengthening of law and order in administrative activity (e.g., by making it easier for citizens to appeal to courts in matters involving illegal decisions taken by administrative bodies).¹³

Resulting from leading socialist ideals and formulated by the socialist doctrine of constitutionalism, the civil rights register introduced, apart from political and human rights, a new category in the form of economic, social and cultural rights. This is indeed a decisive achievement. The resolutions of socialist constitutionalism were internationally accepted in the form of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, then as the Pacts of Political and Individual Rights and the Pacts of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, officially adopted by the United Nations. A 32-year development period of People's Poland has brought tremendous progress in the realization of civil rights. The breakthrough in the consistent realization of the right to work, to study, to public health and to social security is an achievement on a global scale. The achievements of the 1970's and the long-term plans adopted during this period--e.g., a development program for housing construction, a food program, educational reform, the expansion of public health programs and the social security system--are further steps in this direction.

Nevertheless we should add that, in each of these areas, it is necessary to improve the effective realization of these goals, to develop additional initiatives and, as the need arises, to coordinate the undertaken decisions. I cannot begin to emphasize just how important the factor of democratic social activity is in these areas.

One of the crucial problems in the further development of political rights and in the establishment of the right of a citizen to participate in government--a right inherent in socialism--not only by carrying out but also by shaping the policies of his country, is the right to express criticism in the face of adverse phenomena which occur during the process of national development. It is clear that, if there are antagonistic conflicts within the society, antisocialist forces may use this right to take unfair advantage of not only the errors and inconsistencies but the objective difficulties in order to undermine confidence in the people's government. The higher stage of socialist development should promote more favorable conditions so that the resolute struggle with adverse and antisocialist views tied in with the development of healthy criticism aimed at improving government institutions, freeing them from bureaucratic and conservative influences and increasing their ancillary role towards the public, towards the socialist ideals and goals of the vast majority. If a citizen's constructive criticism involves a risk of treating him as an enemy of socialist principles, this leads to "noninvolvement" and generates non-commitment, consequently resulting in the weakening of our positions in the rivalry between both systems which, in itself, is contradictory to our system.

Much remains to be done in order to ensure the complete realization of the directive mentioned in a speech by Comrade Edward Gierek at the Third Plenum of the KC PZPR: "We should also increase the accuracy, responsibility and effectiveness of public and press criticism regarding various adverse phenomena, shortcomings or errors. Party institutions and organizations, people's councils, state and economic management as well as social organizations should respond to criticism in an unbiased and rightful manner. This issue must be continually analyzed and evaluated by party institutions." The stipulation of this statement is not only an unconditional guarantee of human rights but, at the same time, an indispensable factor in overthrowing all that is outdated and standing in the way of social progress and economic development. Such a feeling paves the way for progressive solutions and effective activity.

Thus, the above example shows how inseparable are the strategies of socio-economic and political development, how closely related civil rights and responsibilities are to the general public interest.

The issues of socialist political culture cannot be overlooked in discussing the prerequisites for further socialist democratic development. This is taking on increasingly greater significance at the present time because,

for example, despite the substantially higher standards of living and greater prospects of further development in this fundamental period, we have to build socialism under conditions in which the steadily increasing needs will outdistance the possibilities of their complete fulfillment.

Both the explanations of the reasons for this phenomenon and up-to-date progress reports are, and will be, extremely important especially if one considers that over half the people did not experience the enormous difficulties which had to be overcome and the delays which had to be compensated for.

The period of peaceful coexistence will not be a time of disarmament in the ideological struggle between the two systems. There will be no cessation of attempts to use, against socialism, such relics of past consciousness as displays of nationalism and the misuse of religious and other feelings. One of the conditions for democratic development is, therefore, systematic action to raise the standard of political culture of the society, which is inseparable from socialist consciousness.

Within the society there are still substantial traces of attitudes opposing social discipline within a democracy, demanding the realization of state rights without performing their equal share of responsibility towards the state. This mentality is expressed in nonabidance by social discipline, work discipline in particular, which is manifested through unwarranted absenteeism, mismanagement of work time and a significant turnover in personnel. We have to take the next basic step in order to check the spread of this social disease and to minimize crime and illegalities.

A major obstacle on the road to socialist democratic development is bureaucratic tendencies, evidenced primarily by the obliteration of the ancillary role accorded individual state agencies towards the public, the impersonal and slow processes in rendering public services and by the formalization of social life. Sometimes technocratic tendencies are also observed, e.g., disregard for the social goals of various activities, neglect of public opinion or underestimation of the role of public opinion and social self-government.

Taking these factors into consideration, we conclude that it is not enough to merely stimulate the driving forces of socialist democratic development, it is also necessary to simultaneously eliminate the obstacles on the road to this complex process in which the party, the working class and the whole of society are very much interested. At a meeting of the first secretaries of PZPR factory committees from major enterprises Edward Gierek emphasized the following: "Democracy has to be studied by everyone: state authorities on all levels, personnel and work groups, all the public, each and every citizen."

The development of socialist democracy cannot be considered a daydream of eccentric aesthetes far removed from reality, nor a term used on special

occasions to foretell the future. It is an integral part of the program of socialist building that is already being realized today. The development of socialist democracy is as much a question of an ever fuller realization of civil rights and responsibilities, an issue of utmost importance, as it is an inevitable prerequisite for the effectiveness of combined human efforts.

FOOTNOTES

1. PZPR strategy emphasizing the above trend of development was included in the February 1976 amendment of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] Constitution, especially in Article 7 (which states that "The Polish People's Republic realizes and develops socialist democracy"), in Article 5 ("The Polish People's Republic...guarantees citizens their participation in government and supports the development of various forms of workers' self-government") and in Article 67 ("The Polish People's Republic, by preserving and increasing the achievements of the working class, strengthens and disseminates the achievements of the working class, strengthens and disseminates civil rights and freedoms").
2. Cf Article 3 of the PRL Constitution.
3. Cf "O dalszy dynamiczny rozwój budownictwa socjalistycznego--o wyzsza jakosc pracy i warunkow zycia narodu" [The Further Dynamic Development of Socialist Building--Improved Work Quality and Standards of Living of the People], Uchwala VII Zjazdu PZPR [Resolution of the Seventh PZPR Congress], K i W, Warsaw, 1975, pp 45-46.
4. Cf K. Secomski, "Podstawy planowania perspektywicznego" [Principles of Perspective Planning], Warsaw, 1966, pp 61-62.
5. As stated by J. Pajestka: "...our development policy, especially in the 1960's, was so enmeshed in material and economic difficulties in the development process that it almost solely concentrated on them. Consequently, to a certain degree, it stopped regarding man and social forces as decisive factors of the road to progress" (cf Czynniki wzajemnej zaleznosci rozwoju spoleczno-gospodarczego kraju" [Interdependent Factors of National Socioeconomic Development], Warsaw, 1975, p 56).
6. And again a typical statement regarding the 1960's: "initiative, ingenuity and natural human goals toward progress were underestimated and, at the same time, the effectiveness of enforcing the goals to be realized was overestimated" (cf J. Pajestka, *ibid.*, p 204).
7. E. Forsthoff, "Strukturwandlungen der modernen Demokratie," Berlin, 1964, pp 10, 24. The above opinion was even more liberally stated in a book by A. F. K. Organsky: "The Stages of Political Development," New York, 1967, p 199.

8. I would like to refer to an article by Witold Nowacki in the August 76 issue of *NOWE DROGI*
9. Cf M. Jaroszynski, "Zagadnienia rad narodowych" [Issues of People's Councils], Warsaw, 1961, p 135.
10. A. Achijezer, "Nauchno-tekhnicheskaya rewoliutsiya i upravleniye razwitiyem obshchestwa" [The Scientific and Technical Revolution and the Control of Social Development], *WOPROSY FILOZOFII*, No 8, 1968.
11. Among the factors determining the necessity of socialist democratic development one cannot overlook the praxiological prerequisites. So stated J. Starosciak, sharing this view: "There cannot be democracy with inefficient administration, just as it is impossible to organize administration overlooking the citizens' hopes for participating in the resolution of public affairs: (cf "Administracja: Zagadnienia teorii praktyki" [Administration: Theoretical and Practical Issues], Warsaw, 1974, p 26).
12. Just how vital this problem is can be seen in the following statement by a journalist for *TRYBUNA LUDU*: "Just as through daily observations and our own experience, so through fragmentary scientific research it is obvious that, apart from a system of government which may be called modern (the worker is treated as a partner and joint manager), there still remains a traditional system [a "paternalistic", fatherly system on the one hand, and a primitive "strong hand" on the other]. I. Dryll, "Z mysla o przyszlosci; Postep miedzy ludzmi: [Thoughts of the Future, Progress Among People], *TRYBUNA LUDU*, No 247, 1974.
13. Judicial control over administrative decisions has already been introduced in most European socialist countries (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary). It is also evident in several types of cases in the USSR. In Poland the matter of widening its scope has fully matured.

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POLAND

FRG PAPER ON INCREASED LEVEL OF OPPOSITION TO REGIME

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 26 Oct 76 p 10

[Article by Erik Michael Bader: "Dangerous Sullenness in Poland: Opposition Manifestoes Are Circulating in Warsaw"]

[Text] In Poland there is not much going on politically right now--such is the impression after superficial observation in these days 20 years after that turbulent "Polish October" of 1956, when the people for the first time forced a change of leadership. The television, which generally favors internal reporting in its news broadcasts, had been clearly embarrassed of late by the lack of anything to offer in this field. The decision on vital and urgent economic policy problems, especially the distorted price structure, has been postponed until next fall; other measures to get a grip again on industrial development, primarily in the field of investment, are being prepared almost in silence, without disillusioning publicity. Even by reading between the lines one can find no indications that there is some kind of hard discussion under way, with ultimate personal consequences, on the question of what they did wrong, although there is enough reason for such a discussion. The people are grumbling over shortages of supplies, but they seem by and large to be deeply annoyed rather than rebellious. Unrest prevails in intellectual circles, but it is not really known how far it goes.

The Time Limit for Gierek

This lack of noticeable incidents and clearly perceptible tension should not, however, camouflage the fact that the People's Republic of Poland is at present in an especially critical phase. There is far more at stake than signs of economic overheating and supply bottlenecks. It is a question of whether the gulf of mistrust, which greatly widened at the latest since the strike in June of this year, between the communist leadership and the population, which for the most part is noncommunist, can still be bridged over to some extent, or whether the attempt to rule Poland under a state socialist system, without its actual agreement, it is true, but with a certain consensus of the population, has been temporarily successful once again, without however any chance for another new start. That is a decision

which can proceed silently and only later become fully perceptible. Even if in the next few months nothing occurs on the surface in Poland, it does not necessarily mean that nothing is happening. The leadership still has a chance--but this is probably the last one--once more to arouse the population, disillusioned in expectations which, though not exactly enthusiastic, had at least been invigorated after December 1970, from resigned sullenness to an adequate measure of hope, trust and involvement. But the time limit could quietly run out.

Viewed objectively, the bottlenecks in some supply areas, at least for the moment, are not very dramatic. The behavior of the consumers in buying goods which are scarce, or may become so, in quantities as large as possible, also helps to aggravate them. To these specific bottlenecks is added the fact that the supply of goods generally does not correspond to purchasing power, that often something goes wrong with the even and continuing distribution of products, that production often does not reflect the desires of the buyers, that production often reacts to changes in demand after a long delay and industrial consumer goods often have serious quality defects. The specific bottlenecks, the relative lack of pork, or problems with electric power and coal, are at the worst attributable to factors over which the leadership of the country had no real influence. But everything taken together, and that after years of the much glorified dynamic upswing of the economy of Poland arouses in the population the impression that serious mistakes must have been made.

The mistakes lie more in what was not done, or not tried with sufficient emphasis, than in what was done. A policy, correct in itself and likely to produce success, of dynamization through sharp rise in buying power and intensified investment, often on credit, was not sufficiently insured by structural reforms and efforts to change mentality. They did give the enterprises more room for maneuver, but created no mechanism which ensured that they had to earn their investments, that faulty production or production not in line with the requirements of the market brought disadvantages as well for those responsible. A lot was said about the market, but it was allowed to be only partially effective, and in some decisive areas not at all, which brought about a combination of the disadvantages rather than the advantages of market economy and planned economy.

Large investments were concentrated periodically on certain areas in the boom-fever years, without clear priorities and without calculating cost; many projects became productive later than planned because of organizational mistakes; the above-plan investment boom, which continued to overheat itself, and the wage increases, especially in the construction industry, created an additional purchasing power push unmatched by anything, or not yet matched by anything on the supply side. The investment flood which burst its banks led to the share of consumer goods production in total industrial production sinking, after a temporary rise, so that in 1975 it was lower than in 1971.

On the other hand for quite a long time they let wages rise, as though on a double track, through general raises for whole occupational groups and premiums linked to overcapacity production, much more strongly than productivity was climbing; the latter's growth in turn rested primarily not on increased output by the workers and better organization, but rather on new equipment, which perhaps was partly not yet paid for. They thereby omitted to differentiate production premiums according to actual production, proceeding here too according to the principle of concentrating on certain areas, which did nothing to stimulate production. They set the whole mechanism of economy in motion by means of wages and investments, but let all the points of friction remain and new ones form. More speed and a more rapid heating-up had to be the result.

Serious as the objective economic problems are, the subjective side appears even more marked--the disillusionment of the population over the fact that there are still continual supply problems, that with higher incomes one cannot buy what one wants, and that the rising living standard looks more and more like the illusion of higher numbers. The fact that despite all difficulties things are considerably better in Poland today than 5 or 6 years ago--at least until now--threatens to be obscured in the daily annoyance over unsatisfied desire to buy and worries over the future. Rising demands and expectations play an important role, and make insufficiencies felt much more severely than was previously considered normal. But these demands and expectations have been intensified by years of economic miracle propaganda in a self-congratulatory style. The propaganda apparently also inspired such euphoria in the apparatus and the leadership, that they reacted too late and not energetically enough to signs of crisis. There is the danger that the impression will take hold that now that nothing has become decisively better, let it get worse wherever possible. Then new programs and new leadership personalities could no longer arouse the enthusiasm necessary for a fresh impetus. This effect of final sullen apathy in Poland can be worse than an explosive outbreak, which could be followed by new hope.

When Will the Crisis Become Acute?

The initial expectations in the Gierek era, that there would not only be a higher living standard, but also more democracy, more freedom, and more cooperation, have long since evaporated. At the latest in June, when the leadership tried to rush through in a surprise attack the food price increases which they had so long delayed out of sheer fear of the reaction of the population. The outlook for a better living standard through more effective management had caused this lack of democracy to be forgotten temporarily, as long as the economic outlook remained relatively unclouded.

But it is now becoming clear that the system without codetermination was not able to produce these expected economic achievements on the expected scale and continuously, and the same penury was still occurring at a higher level.

Some mistakes of the past years would presumably have still been incurred with more codetermination of whatever sort, but it would have enlisted more enthusiasm and trust and more readiness to persevere for the phase of waiting and restraint.

But it is not only the overheated boom and material concerns for the future deriving from the variously genuine or apparent shortages which burden the never very great confidence of the Poles in their political system. In addition there is the concern over a hardening aroused by the highly superfluous constitutional reform at the beginning of the year and the reprisals against participants in the protest actions of June, in which the law was frequently broken, especially through mistreatment in the interrogation. The news of excesses by the security organs, against which apparently no steps were taken, intensifies the negative effect of the certain painful impression that the leadership had to give in to the protesting workers with their long delay in the question of food prices, but could not bring itself to grant them amnesty; that would have had the effect of a total capitulation in the face of a violent protest, which would have been avoidable with "consultation" of the population which was not only apparent and ostensible.

These two occurrences again revived opposition in various quarters in Poland. Even though one cannot speak of an opposition unity front of Church-Intellectuals-Workers now, there is still a consonance and simultaneity of the expressions of displeasure. Contacts are being established. In certain circles of the capital at least, a lively business in communiques duplicated on the typewriter, manifestoes, and bulletins of critical content seems to prevail.

There are already indications that the protest is shifting into programmatic demands. A leadership which has become unsure, and above all overeager security organs, which in the past have already shown more talent in really fanning the flames they were supposed to extinguish, could react with measures which would have to provoke an escalation. The latent political crisis could become acute. But such a development still seems to be avoidable.

But the situation is still grim and a way out hard to discern, especially with the small room for maneuver which is available in Poland. The leadership under Gierek faces the dilemma that an opening to more discussion and codetermination as well as a tightening of the screw would entail considerable risks, that it cannot, however, simply soften decisions and trust that everything will get back into line again by itself or with a couple of "campaigns." In the course of the past 1 1/2 years, since the critical development appeared, one has been able to gain the impression that it had a calming effect on the population if the leadership, especially Gierek himself, openly admitted to a certain extent weaknesses and deficiencies. Would perhaps the most promising way be that of uninhibited honesty? With crisis management, appeals, and some shifts of personnel alone it would not seem to be possible this time in any case.

YUGOSLAVIA

BRIEFS

NEW SLOVENIAN YOUTH JOURNAL EDITOR--At its session, the Presidency of the Republic Conference of the Youth Association of Slovenia relieved Janko Tedesko of the position of responsible editor of the journal MLADINA and appointed Matjaz Zajec to replace him. Zajec will also exercise the function of chief and responsible editor of MLADINA. [Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovenian 21 Oct 76 p 3]

OFFICIAL VISITS ILL BISHOP--On 12 November 1976, Stane Kolman, President of the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities of Slovenia, visited Dr Jozef Pogacnik, Archbishop of Ljubljana and Metropolitan of the Slovenian Ecclesiastical Province. Dr Pogacnik is undergoing treatment for a little while at the Gerontological Institute of the Ljubljana Clinical Center. President Kolman had a short conversation with him and wished him speedy recovery. [Ljubljana DELO in Slovenian 13 Nov 76 p 2]

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